Hämäläinen v Finland - Preview of the judgment by Constantin Cojocariu

July 11, 2014, 11:50 am

≫ Next: Some thoughts on the significance of Campeanu v. Romania, before the Grand Chamber ruling on 17 July 2014

$

0

0

(CROSS-POSTED FROM THE ECHR SEXUAL ORIENTATION BLOG)

In advance of the Grand Chamber judgment in Hämäläinen v Finland next Wednesday, Constantin Cojocariu has written a guest post on the case. Constantin is the applicant's lawyer, and represented her in the Grand Chamber hearing last October. Many thanks to Constantin for this insightful and interesting post. 

The Court has recently announced it will deliver its judgment in the Hamalainen v Finland case on 16 July. The facts of this case are relatively straightforward. Heli Hamalainen, the applicant, is a trans woman who has been married for many years and who has a 12-year old child with her wife. She came out as transgender during marriage, and applied for legal gender recognition. The authorities in Finland rejected her request, as she and her wife were not willing to forgo their marriage, a precondition to legal gender recognition under national law. The applicant exhausted domestic remedies and lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining about breaches of her rights under Article 8 (right to private and family life), Article 12 (right to marry) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). On 13 November 2012, the Chamberrejected the complaint on all counts, based on reasoning that was reminiscent of that employed in the same-sex marriage case Schalk and Kopf v Austria. In that case, the Court made it clear that the Convention did not require states to open marriage to same-sex couples, and that that option remained within their margin of appreciation, at least for the time being. The Hamalainen judgment was even out of step with previous judgments in forced divorce cases (namely Parry v the United Kingdom), where the Court at least acknowledged the predicament of spouses in a transgender marriage faced with the choice between marriage and legal gender recognition. This article discusses some of the choices I have made, as the applicant’s main counsel, during proceedings before the Court, the different factors that may influence the eventual decision, as well as, briefly, the possible outcomes before the Grand Chamber.

I got involved in the case after the Chamber delivered its judgment, and asked that it be referred to the Grand Chamber, based on reasons discussed in a guest postpublished previously on this blog. In my request and subsequently during proceedings before the Grand Chamber, I tried very hard to distinguish the case from the broader question of same-sex marriage. Some commentators, including Paul Johnson, criticised my choice, stating that it would have been preferable to argue the case for same sex marriage more broadly. Indeed, equal marriage legislation also benefits transgender spouses, as it removes the underlying objection to legal gender recognition of the trans spouse. However, in my view, attempting to distance ourselves as much as possible from the contentious issue of same-sex marriage was the only reasonable chance we had to succeed.

The Court is obviously not ready to move forward on the issue, at least not until a more solid consensus builds among Council of Europe member states towards opening marriage to same-sex couples. And there are sufficient grounds for making this distinction – forced divorce legislation severs an existing marriage that is valid and intact, whereas discriminatory marriage legislation does not allow same-sex marriage to form in the first place. We emphasized that there were countries that had made this distinction (such as Germany and Switzerland), demonstrating that allowing transgender marriages to subsist did not necessarily require equalising marriage rights. Experience shows that the Court will only find a breach of the Convention on the narrowest of grounds, and that it usually refrains from deciding incidental issues that it was not called to decide in the first place. My choice was strategic, and is not dissimilar for example to that made by the applicants inX and Others v Austria, on second-parent adoption in a same-sex couple, who stressed that they were not seeking to compare their situation to that of married different sex couples (at §108). On the other hand, if I tried to draw attention from the elephant in the room - same-sex marriage - I did so in the knowledge that a positive outcome would benefit indirectly homosexual couples as well, by substantially undermining the rationale for preserving marriage as an institution reserved for different sex couples.   

The particular setup in Finland makes this case a slightly more difficult proposal. Transgender marriages are not ended by divorce upon the legal gender recognition of one of the spouses (in that sense, the system may be more accurately described as triggering the “forced dissolution of marriage” rather than “forced divorce”). Instead, marriages are automatically and comparatively painlessly converted into registered partnerships, upon the consent of the cisgender spouse. In addition, registered partnerships in Finland are more or less identical to marriage in terms of the rights and benefits conferred on the spouses as well as in relation to their children. The legal regime in place in Finland is therefore relatively benign, at least compared to other countries where alternatives to marriage are not available and/or divorce proceedings are particularly arduous and lengthy.

It therefore follows that I had to fall back on the personal and religious significance of marriage in general, and to the spouses in this case in particular. Although the applicant had not made a claim under Article 9, I tried to introduce religious considerations through the back door of Article 8 - married life comes with the scope of “family rights” and marriage is recognised to also have a religious dimension. This is a very strong argument, particularly pertinent to the applicant and her spouse, which the Court cannot easily discount as it mines the rich vein of its jurisprudence emphasizing the privileged status of marriage, justifying preferential legal treatment. Particularly in our day and age, the state has no business whatsoever interfering with valid marriages under any pretext, including the gender identity of the parties. In that sense, forced marriage legislation, as well as the reasoning of the Chamber in this case, very well reveal (as argued by Andrew Sharpe in Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodiesof Law) the “intrinsic homophobia of the law.”

Three additional brief observations. Perhaps it would have been preferable to include the applicant’s spouse, as well as their child, as victims in their own right from the very beginning of the proceedings before the Court, as their family rights are more obviously interfered with. That said, the Court is obligated in principle to also consider the consequences of the forced divorce scheme on third parties, including family members, during its proportionality examination under Article 8. Second, two processes are ongoing in Finland in parallel with proceedings in this case, which may result eventually in the repealing of forced marriage legislation. A legislative initiative is currently before the Finnish Parliament to equalise marriage rights, which however appears to have run into some trouble; and a committee was formed to look into the possibility of revising legal gender recognition legislation, including by abandoning the divorce requirement. To the extent that either of these processes had been concluded successfully before the Court delivered its judgment, that would have constituted a substantial consideration in the process of adjudicating the case in Strasbourg as well, potentially undermining the government’s insistence that there had been religiously and morally inspired objections in Finland. Finally, I spent a fair amount of time and space trying to unpack the normative contents of Article 12 on the right to marry. Without going into details, it seems to me that forced divorce legislation empties Article 12 of any significance, to the extent that Article 12 is interpreted as allowing the state to interfere with valid marriages to the point of triggering their dissolution. It will be interesting to see how the Court decides this issue.

To conclude, there are three possible outcomes in this case. The first is a win, which may vary in scope, to include various combinations of the claims made. This would be an amazing outcome, with substantial consequences for standards in the area of legal gender recognition more generally as well as marriage rights. The second is a qualified loss, but based on a more principled and sympathetic approach to the applicant’s situation and transgender rights in general. In this scenario, the Court may reject the application based on the lack of any material differences between marriage and registered partnerships in Finland.  While this would open the way for challenges against forced divorce legislation in countries without alternatives to marriage, it may spill over by encouraging states to maintain similar but segregated legal regimes for same-sex and different sex couples respectively. The third, and the least likely, outcome is the worst, with the Grand Chamber endorsing the Chamber decision, thus in effect denying the specificity of the issues raised in transgender cases.

Constantin Cojocariu is an independent human rights expert and lawyer specialised in advising transgender and disabled applicants in proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.

---

Some thoughts on the significance of Campeanu v. Romania, before the Grand Chamber ruling on 17 July 2014

July 14, 2014, 7:44 am

≫ Next: European Court order to place man under guardianship and interim measures request

≪ Previous: Hämäläinen v Finland - Preview of the judgment by Constantin Cojocariu

$

0

0

Valentin Campeanu, the applicant in the case Campeanu v. Romania, pending before the Grand Chamber of the European Court, was an intellectually disabled orphaned young man who grew up in an institution. When he turned 18 in 2003, Valentin was discharged from the home where he spent most of his childhood. The only option that the authorities envisaged was to transfer him to an adults’ institution. However, no institution was initially willing to accept him presumably because of stigma attached to his HIV positive status. The authorities eventually succeeded to secure his transfer to a social care home by fraudulently concealing his diagnosis. The transfer, which took place on 5 February 2004, was unsuccessful, as Valentin only spent a few days at the social care home, before he was taken to the Poiana Mare Psychiatric Hospital, infamous at the time for its grotesquely high patient mortality rates due to extremely substandard living conditions. Valentin was effectively abandoned in an unheated storage room without food and medical treatment, and died on 20 February 2004.  The official investigation followed the familiar pattern of all investigations in Romania into institutional abuse allegations before and since – it was very superficial and ended up with a finding of non-indictment. We filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights on Valentin’s behalf in 2009. In recognition of its importance, in 2012 jurisdiction over the case was relinquished to the Grand Chamber, which will finally deliver its judgment on 17 July 2014.

This case is only the second disability case that has been heard by the Grand Chamber of the European Court after Stanev v Bulgaria over the past twenty-odd years, in itself a marker of its significance. Like many other disability cases originating in Eastern Europe, it illustrates the multifaceted and severe failure by state institutions to protect and support people with disabilities, leading to a wide range of violations of the Convention. In this post, I will try to tease out briefly the significance of the case and of the ruling ahead of us, not an easy task considering the complexity of the issues involved.

Although it may sound tedious, a procedural issue takes centre stage in this case. However, in case of a win this may have the most far-reaching consequences going even beyond disability rights. Valentin’s mother abandoned him at birth and died in the meantime. He has no other known relatives and he had not been placed under guardianship. And here comes the snag – only close relatives/guardians have standing to file a complaint regarding the circumstances in which their loved ones died under Article 2 of the Convention on the right to life. Our complaint also included claims under other articles of the Convention, including the right to liberty and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment – for rights other than the right to life, the theory is that relatives may only claim violations of rights that are transferrable, like the right to property, but not of non-transferrable rights, like the right to liberty. Since Valentin, like many other people with disabilities languishing in institutions, had no relatives, we argued that the Court should allow NGOs working in the disability field to represent him – in this case the Centre for Legal Resources (CLR).

The issue is complicated, particularly as the Court’s jurisprudence is ridden with exceptions and inconsistencies, but in essence our line of argument was that the Court could not let the Government escape its responsibilities under the Convention for such serious violations under the pretext of a mere technicality. We asked during the hearing, and the Government could not answer – how else could Campeanu’s case reach the European Court if not through an NGO? It helped that the national courts recognised that the CLR had standing to represent Campeanu and that the European Court’s sister regional human rights tribunals use comparatively more generous admissibility requirements which would have permitted them to hear this case. Understandably, the Court was uneasy about our arguments fearing that it may open the floodgates of NGO-driven public interest litigation compounding its well-known caseload problem. Without going into details, in case of a positive ruling on admissibility, the Court will likely wish to define the circumstances of NGO standing very narrowly. In any event, such a ruling would be very beneficial, as it would afford NGOs additional space before the European Court to defend vulnerable individuals, not necessarily restricted to persons with disabilities.

On the substance, contrary to public perceptions this is not necessarily a case about living conditions in institutions, of which there had been others already. Valentin spent very little time at the social care home and then at the psychiatric hospital where he died, after being discharged from the institution where he grew up. This case is a rare glimpse into state practices relative to people with disabilities in their care and under their control, whereby the authorities are allowed to operate in a grey area outside the remit of any cognisable law or procedure, without any meaningful supervision and without the fear of any consequences, giving their disablist prejudice free rein and enabling them to dispose of people’s life and death at will. In that sense, this case presents troubling similitudes with the much more publicised practices of extraordinary rendition operated by the United States during the “war on terror”. The fact that Campeanu’s name ever reached public consciousness in itself is a miracle as it was completely fortuitous. It so happened that on the day when Valentin died, a CLR monitor visited Poiana Mare Hospital, witnessed his plight and upon her return took immediate action on his behalf. It is reasonable to infer that Valentin’s death is not an exceptional occurrence, and that similar abuses are the rule in institutions across Romania.  Documenting this reality is one of the main purposes of this case.

Although a long litany of horrendous abuses which took place in Romanian institutions have been documented and came to light over the past twenty years, little has changed. Not only did authorities refuse to engage in meaningful reform, but they didn’t even acknowledge the scale of abuse or the fact that something is fundamentally wrong in the social care system in Romania. In proceedings in this case, the authorities added injury to insult by busily denying that anything untoward happened at the Poiana Mare Hospital, or that Valentin died from anything other than natural death. The Government’s agent even presented and knowingly relied on forged documents seeking to displace overwhelming evidence of mistreatment. This attitude is reminiscent of that displayed by authorities involved in Campeanu’s care and the investigation into his death, indicating how little has changed in the past ten years, and how prevalent the problems are. A positive judgment may push the Government to acknowledge past and current abuses, an indispensible step on the path to real reform. 

The second objective of the case is to tease out the contents of State obligations towards a group of people whose claims have rarely been heard by the Court: people like Valentin who live in institutions for long periods of time, without any relatives or anybody else to represent their interests, with severely impaired mental capacity, completely dependant on the state for their day to day existence and long term future. Currently, the Court has only occasionally ruled that states should take action ex officio to safeguard the rights of members of this group, for example by requiring a system of automatic and periodic review of the lawfulness of involuntary psychiatric detention under Article 5.1(e). The main question in this context is related to their access to justice, the absence of which made such abuses as exemplified in this case possible to start with – we argued for example that states should have in place independent monitoring mechanisms to prevent torture akin to those required under OPCAT. Additionally, we are looking for a general acknowledgment from the Court that the warehousing and mistreatment of people with disabilities in institutions is, in this day and age, completely unacceptable, that people with disabilities should be involved in all decision-making that concerns them, that they should receive support to take decisions etc. This may sound unreasonably hopeful, particularly considering the Court’s past record on disability. Then again, this may be just the type of case occasioning such sweeping statements with the Grand Chamber clarifying in an authoritative manner that people with disabilities too are entitled to expect substantive protection under the Convention.

Finally, I would like to formally acknowledge the contribution of many, many people who helped document, reveal, litigate, and support in many ways during the past ten years the efforts to secure accountability for the high mortality rates at the Poiana Mare Hospital during two consecutive winters in 2002-2004, and of which Campeanu v. Romania is a part. This is the sort of long term, complex engagement that tests the viability of strategic litigation as a whole, possibly paralleled in Eastern Europe only by the campaigns around the Roma education case D.H. and Others v Czech Republic and Roma pogroms centred around Moldovan and Others v. Romania. The Centre for Legal Resources, including many people who came and went, have spearheaded this process at national level, and I have taken over when we filed the case to the European Court in 2007. I remember distinctly that very few people at the time – if any – gave these cases any chance of success considering the standing problem outlined above. To have reached the Grand Chamber is already an achievement, to go further would be amazing.

Further background information about this case is available HERE, HERE (in English) and HERE (in Romanian). Constantin Cojocariu is an independent human rights expert and lawyer specialised in advising transgender and disabled applicants in proceedings before the European Court of Human Right, and who acted as the applicant's counsel in Campeanu v. Romania. 

European Court order to place man under guardianship and interim measures request

October 24, 2014, 7:31 am

≫ Next: Monica Macovei si persoanele cu dizabilitati (sau De ce NU votez cu Monica Macovei)

≪ Previous: Some thoughts on the significance of Campeanu v. Romania, before the Grand Chamber ruling on 17 July 2014

$

0

0

This is a brief post about a case pending before the European Court of Human Rights of a man diagnosed with schizophrenia, and who has been held for fourteen years in psychiatric hospitals apparently without a valid justification. Before I got involved in the case as the applicant's representative, the Court instructed the Romanian Government to place the applicant under guardianship as a measure aimed at ensuring the smooth running of proceedings
in the case before it. Except the problem in Romania is that guardianship completely deprives the person in question of their legal capacity amounting to "civil death", not restricted solely to litigation capacity. The Government complied and started guardianship proceedings. I recently filed an interim measures request trying to stop these proceedings, which however the Court summarily rejected as exceeding the scope of Rule 39. No judges have even seen my request. I find it particularly worrying that the Court is endorsing an institution (unreformed guardianship) that is de plano in breach of the CRPD. I will write more about this case and others, but for the time being I am publishing here my request for interim measures which has just been rejected. It is available HERE. For a word copy of the document please write to me directly: constantincojocariu@yahoo.com

Monica Macovei si persoanele cu dizabilitati (sau De ce NU votez cu Monica Macovei)

October 31, 2014, 8:11 am

≫ Next: Hämäläinen v. Finland: A Story of Illusory Consensus and Lesser Families

≪ Previous: European Court order to place man under guardianship and interim measures request

$

0

0

As dori sa comentez pe scurt pozitia Dnei Macovei strict cu privire la persoanele cu dizabilitati, din perspectiva drepturilor omului. Nu imi propun sa analizez contextul mai larg al politicilor sociale, sau optiunilor dumneaei ideologice, au facut-o altii. De asemenea nu ma intereseaza in acest moment propunerile relevante ale celorlalti candidati. M-am uitat repede pe programnul Dlui Johannis si am vazut ca nu pare a include nici o precizare in acest sens. Nu ma intereseaza ceilalti candidati, cu atat mai putin Dl Ponta, dar din cate banuiesc nici ei nu au o pozitie explicita pe aceasta tema. Am ales totusi sa ma concentrez pe Dna Macovei pentru ca dumneaei a ales sa abordeze acest subiect, pentru ca se revendica, prin experienta sa profesionala, de la ideologia drepturilor omului, si avand in vedere deschiderea ei europeana.

In programul dumneaei, Dna Macovei mentioneaza persoanele cu dizabilitati, declarand ca “Trebuie eliminate și sistemele de mită socială cu scop electoral, pentru că bătrânii, copiii, bolnavii și persoanele cu handicap sunt singurele categorii pe care statul trebuie să le protejeze.” Ieri (30 octombrie), Dna Macovei a afisat o declaratie filmata pe contul dumneaei de Facebook, privind, din nou, persoanele cu dizabilitati:

“Eu cred în solidaritate, dar nu cred în falsa asistență. Ce se întâmplă cu persoanele cu dizabilități ne privește pe toți. Unii s-au născut așa, alții, nu. Ceva în viața lor i-a adus aici: un accident, o boală. Pe toți ne privește ceea ce se întâmplă cu ei. Persoanele cu dizabilități nu sunt o povară pentru societate. Ei sunt egalii noștri, ei sunt frații noștri. Acești oameni trebuie să fie primii care să contribuie la redactarea și aplicarea legilor care îi privesc pe ei. Numai cine a trecut prin asta ne poate învăța cum să fim o societate mai bună și oameni mai buni.”

Persoanele cu dizabiliati din Romania se confrunta cu mai multe probleme grave. Multi sunt internati pe lunga durata in institutii sociale si spitale psihiatrice, unde traiesc o viata izolata si lipsita de speranta, in conditii mizere, fiind supusi deseori unor tratamente inumane si degradante. Este notoriu cazul Spitalului Poiana Mare unde acum zece ani au murit sute de pacienti din cauza conditiilor de viata precare si lipsei ingrijirilor medicale de baza. Acest scandal a rezultat intr-o condamnare de rasunet a Romaniei la CEDO intr-un caz in care l-am reprezentat pe reclamant Campeanu v Romania, si de care Dna Macovei stie cu siguranta. Dezvaluiri similare cu privire la abuzuri grave sunt la ordinea zilei. Cu toate acestea, Romania nu numai ca tolereaza abuzurile, dar refuza sa se angajeze in reforma sistemului prin dezinstitutionalizare. Acest proces presupune inchiderea institutiilor si mutarea persoanelor cu dizabilitati in comunitate. Conform studiilor stiintifice si experientei altor tari, dezinstitutionalizarea profita atat persoanelor cu dizabilitati cat si societatii in intregul ei.

Sistemul actual de beneficii sociale este invechit si mentine persoanele cu dizabilitati care traiesc in comunitate si familiile lor la limita saraciei , inchizandu-le intr-o relatie de dependenta, si condamnandu-le la inactivitate si izolare. Infrastructura si serviciile oferite publicului sunt inaccesibile. In cazul fericit in care persoanele cu dizabilitati ajung sa invete, o fac in scoli speciale unde standardele sunt catastrofale si abuzurile frecvente. Lipsa educatiei duce implicit la lipsa oportunitatilor in viata, la excluziune, marginalizare si singuratate. Atunci cand retelele de suport din comunitate se destrama (parintii mor, prietenii sunt epuizati), persoanele cu dizabilitati ajung inevitabil in institutii. Daca institutiile statului sunt ineficiente si retrograde, prejudecatile larg impartasite la nivelul populatiei si nepasarea pecetluiesc soarta acestor persoane.

In concluzie, avem cateva cuvinte cheie: dezinstitutionalizare, incluziune sociala, protectie eficienta impotriva abuzurilor, egalitate, demnitate. Acestea corespund in mare principiilor directoare ale Conventiei Natiunilor Unite a Drepturilor Persoanelor cu Dizabilitati, ratificata de Romania si de marea majoritatate a statelor membre a Uniunii Europene, cat si separat de Uniunea Europeana. Nu am auzit niciunul din aceste principii cheie in discursul Doamnei Macovei. Asta in ciuda faptului ca Dna Macovei se revendica de la ideologia drepturilor omului si a fost cu siguranta expusa, cel putin la Parlamentul European, acestui discurs. Tin sa precizez in acest sens ca doleantele persoanelor cu dizabilitati nu sunt un subiect de nisa – din punct de vedere numeric, persoanele cu dizabilitati si familiile lor sunt o minoritate semnificativa, de ordinul sutelor de mii; din punct de vedere moral si legal, un stat de drept este incompatibil cu impunitatea pentru tortura si rele tratamente practicate pe scara larga.

Situandu-le intre copii si batrani, Dna Macovei infantilizeaza persoanele cu dizabilitati pe care le priveste ca recipienti pasivi de beneficii sociale. Enuntul programatic in speta este practic identic cu prevederea constitutionala conform careia “persoanele cu handicap se bucura de protectie speciala”, deomonstrand in mod clar o logica asistentiala. Am scris mai demult despre dublul sens al terminologiei folosite la adresa persoanelor cu dizabilitati: in logica actuala “protectie speciala” inseamna in fapt segregare, marginalizare, discriminare, abuz. De fapt, persoanele cu dizabilitati nu au nevoie de “protectie” ci de “suport” pentru a-si implini potentialul si a deveni membri cu drepturi depline ai societatii. In aceeasi nota, Dna Macovei foloseste terminologia discreditata si stigmatizanta de handicap”, eroare rectificata in mesajul video.

Cat despre mesajul video el se inspira in mod clar din modelul medical al dizabilitatii, care identifica “handicapul”  (deci persoana) drept cauza a problemelor intampinate de persoanelor cu dizabilitati. Acestui model Conventia ONU mai sus amintita ii opune modelul social, care identifica problema in barierele ridicate de societate si care impiedica participarea persoanelor cu dizabilitati, exemplul cel mai clar fiind lipsa accesibilitatii. Monica Macovei insista pe blestemul existential al handicapului, intr-un discurs lacrimogen menit sa starneasca compasiunea. Ori persoanele cu dizabilitati nu au nevoie de compasiune, ci de respect, iar handicapul nu e blestem, ci poate, eventual, o manifestare a diversitatii umane.

Singura parte aparent pozitiva este apelul Doamnei Macovei la implicarea persoanelor cu dizabilitati in elaborarea politicilor care le priveste. Dar, stati putin – in timp ce face asta, cui se adreseaza Dna Macovei? Se adreseaza cumva persoanelor cu dizabilitati, semnaland dorinta ei de a le include ca partener egal in discutie? Nu! Ni se adreseaza noua, voua, oamenilor “normali si maturi”, vorbind despre persoanele cu dizabilitati la persoana treia, cumva prezente in camera, dar invizibile. Asadar, pe langa faptul ca e, in cel mai bun caz, neinformata, Dna Macovei insulta persoanele cu dizabilitati. In acest sens, si avand in vedere cheia discursului prezentat mai sus, permiteti-mi sa ma indoiesc de sinceritatea Dnei Macovei.

Inca ceva despre ideea primita de-a gata si regurgitata de fanii Dnei Macovei fara nici un pic de reflectie, conform careia marsul anti-coruptie al candidatei lor preferate va profita implicit si minoritatilor. Am precizat mai sus ca in ultimii 10-15 ani, sute, mii de oameni au murit in conditii suspecte sau au fost brutalizati in institutii. Cu ocazia sedintei publice in dosarul Campeanu anul trecut, CEDO a solicitat partilor sa prezinte exemple de condamnari ale celor vinovati. In timp ce Guvernul nu a fost in masura sa prezente nici macar un singur exemplu, noi am fost in masura sa aducem numaroase exemple de NUP-uri, semnificand practic ca personalul din spitale se bucura in mod oficial de impunitate. Cine este vinovat de aceasta stare de fapt? BINGO! Procurorii Dnei Macovei, idolizati si glorificati ca luptatori neinfricati impotriva coruptiei, panaceu universal, etc etc. Dna Codruta Kovesi insasi, pupila Dna Macovei, a confirmat un NUP in dosarul Campeanu care a scandalizat pe multi in Europa. Dna Macovei insasi cat a fost la Ministerul Justitiei, nu a facut nimic pentru a rezolva aceasta situatie, si daca a facut ceva, nu se vede nici o schimbare. Acesta este doar un exemplu care ilustreaza de ce drive-ul anticoruptie in sine nu vindeca de prejudecati si nu poate fi o solutie pentru peoblemele sociale cum sugereaza Dna Macovei 

Unii fani Macovei sugereaza cu obtuzitate ca abuzul si tortura nu sunt chestiuni urgente, si ca intai trebuie sa rezolvam cu coruptii. Permiteti-mi sa nu fiu de acord, si sa nu mai am rabdare. Pentru mine cauza persoanelor cu dizabilitati este urgenta si fundamentala. Avand in vedere cele de mai sus, eu NU votez cu Dna Macovei. In primul rand pentru ca politicile ei in domeniul dizabilitatii ar perpetua dezastrul actual. In al doilea rand, si in alta ordine de idei, pentru ca o suspectez ca abuzeaza, insultandu-ne inteligenta, de realizarile sale indubitabile in domeniul drepturilor omului pentru a promova o agenda distructiva la adresa drepturilor omului.

Hämäläinen v. Finland: A Story of Illusory Consensus and Lesser Families

January 6, 2015, 6:02 am

≫ Next: Public hearing before the Grand Chamber in Gherghina v. Romania

≪ Previous: Monica Macovei si persoanele cu dizabilitati (sau De ce NU votez cu Monica Macovei)

$

0

0

This article is an edited version of a presentation that I gave at the Rights on the Move: Rainbow Families in Europe Conference that took place in Trento, Italy, on 16-17 October 2014.

This article offers a different perspective on the recent European Court of Human Rights Hämäläinen v. Finland judgment, primarily informed by my experience of acting as the applicant’s representative. As this is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis, I will try, as much as possible, not to reiterate criticism already formulated by Judges Sajó, Keller and Lemmens in their brilliant dissenting opinion, as well as by other commentators (see for example hereor here). At the same time, mine is a view centered more on trans rights, as opposed to other commentators, who usually examined the judgment against the context of the Court’s jurisprudence on same-sex families more broadly. I advance two particular suggestions. First, the fact that trans people frequently inhabit a space of legal informality across Europe renders some of the Court’s methodological tools inappropriate – and I refer here in particular to consensus. Second, this judgment demonstrates that existing legal categories (such as sexual orientation) do not provide a satisfactory basis for categorizing trans people’s claims. This means that alternative arguments may have to be developed that more accurately reflect the particular experience of trans people.

(caption from public hearing before the Grand Chamber on 16 October 2013)

Which consensus?

The facts of the case are quite straightforward – the applicant celebrated a heterosexual marriage as a man, had a child together with her wife, and after ten years of married life came out as a trans woman. Under Finnish law, legal gender recognition of a married individual is conditional on a relatively seamless conversion of marriage into registered partnership, offering, for all effects and purposes, the same legal rights as marriage. The applicant argued before the Court that this amounted to forced divorce and complained about the breach of her rights under Articles 8 (right to private and family life), 12 (right to marry) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention.  The Court rejected the applicant’s claims twice – in Chamberand Grand Chamber formations respectively. The Grand Chamber held that Member States (MS) did not have an obligation to open marriage to same sex couples and that in any event it was not disproportionate to ask the applicant to accept a change in her civil status as a result of legal gender recognition, seeing that registered partnership was more or less identical to marriage in its legal effects.

The Hämäläinen Court’s determination that there was no consensus among MS on the issues involved in the case was critical to the eventual outcome. However, there are a number of general and trans-specific objections in relation to the manner in which the Court measured and then employed consensus. There are significant differences between the Court’s own survey and information available from other sources. In Hämäläinen, the Court found that 24 MS “have no clear legal framework for legal gender recognition or no legal provisions which specifically deal with the status of married persons who have undergone gender reassignment” (at §32). In the seminal trans rights case Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdomdecided twelve years earlier in 2002, the Court relied on a finding that a vast majority of the MS surveyed (33 out of 37) permitted legal gender recognition (at §§55, 84). The two data sets don’t appear to square up, suggesting that there has been some backsliding since Goodwin, which surely cannot be accepted. On the other hand, a Europe-wide survey undertaken by ILGA Europe in 2012, which I referred to in my submissions, suggested that a slim majority of 24 ½ out of 47 MS permitted trans marriages to subsist post-legal gender recognition of one of the spouses.

The disparity between these surveys may possibly be explained by a difference in methodologies. Legal gender recognition is available in many countries based on administrative or judicial practice, which may be unreported, even in the absence of expressly stated legal rules. Even if such practice may be inconsistent or unclear, trans people may in effect be able to change their documents in many countries that the Court cited as lacking explicit legislation in the area. Furthermore, the Court cannot draw the conclusion that married people cannot transition legally simply from the absence of specific regulations to that effect. Particularly in a civil law tradition, courts will frequently require that any cause for the dissolution of marriage – including in the context of legal gender recognition – be expressly provided for in the law. For example, in 2006, the Austrian Constitutional Court ruled out forced divorce in a transgender marriage as it lacked a clear basis in the law. To the extent that consensus is based on a black or white reading of the law, it may not therefore represent an accurate depiction of the situation of trans people in many countries. Furthermore, the Court’s approach to consensus in Hämäläinen begs the broader question if any progress on trans rights is even feasible in the short term, given the unavoidable weight of a large number of countries with unclear procedures on legal gender recognition.

This notwithstanding, there still are some countries, such as Ireland, where legal gender recognition is simply not available, in any circumstances. The situation in those countries is in breach of existing jurisprudence to start with, as the Court had already largely validated the standard promoted by the Committee of Ministers that legal gender recognition procedures must be available, that should be “quick, transparent and accessible”, in cases such as Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom or L. v. Lithuania. The Court cannot legitimately rely on a states’ culpable failure to comply with clear jurisprudence to build a consensus against trans people seeking legal gender recognition, like Heli Hämäläinen.

Any inferences drawn from a flawed survey must surely also be questionable. The Court had several alternatives to the problematic approach of focusing on the large number of countries said to lack clearly stated legislation on legal gender recognition, which it had recourse to elsewhere in its jurisprudence.  It could have discarded consensus as an adjudicatory tool in this case because it has not yielded useful results. It could have relied on clearly identifiable trends across Europe towards the simplification of legal gender recognition procedures, including by abandoning forced divorce, as argued by the applicant and the third party interveners in the case, and as per its celebrated approach in Christine Godwin. Finally, it could have taken into account the sample of states that took an explicit stand on the issue of transgender marriages, one way or the other, as it did in Vallianatos v. Greece or in X and others v Austria. Consensus determined in this way would actually have favored the applicant - 13 out of 19 countries would not have interfered with her marriage.

It has been pointed out elsewhere that at times the Court appears to manufacture a consensus to suit a predetermined outcome. On the other hand, in Hämäläinen consensus appear to shift even within the same judgment, leading to alarming conclusions. The Court stated initially that 24 out of 47 MS either lacked any legal framework on gender recognition OR specifically banned married people from changing their documents, warranting a wide margin of appreciation. However, at §80 the Court noted that “contrary to the majority of the Council of Europe member States, there exists a legal framework in Finland designed to provide legal recognition for the change of gender.” It appears that the Court all of a sudden made an assumption that all those 24 countries lacked any cognizable gender recognition frameworks, omitting to take into account the unspecified number of countries where legal gender recognition was possible, even if at the same time their position on transgender marriages was not clearly stated. This may have been an error, but it led to the questionable and unwarranted conclusion that the margin of appreciation “must in principle extend both to the State’s decision whether or not to enact legislation concerning legal recognition of the new gender of post-operative transsexuals and, having intervened, to the rules it lays down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests” (at §75). Judge Ziemele, concurring, emphasized the same point, stating that since “Finland already belongs to a minority group of States which recognize the relevant legal consequences of a gender change…, [it] is rather advanced in its internal processes as compared with the other societies and probably does comply with positive obligations in so far as they can be deduced to exist.” Since Finland already went beyond what was strictly required under the Convention, Judge Ziemele’s reasoning went, the Court might as well have stopped at this juncture without going into the proportionality analysis.

The manner in which the Court manipulated consensus in Hämäläinenhas the potential to destabilize its jurisprudence on trans rights, and weaken rights that we thought had already been won. Christine Goodwin is a celebrated precedent precisely because it removed legal gender recognition from the margin of appreciation, and recognized it as a right derived from Article 8, corresponding to a positive obligation that states owed under the Convention. MS do not have a choice in this respect, as the Court now suggests in Hämäläinen. Although alarming, this statement may have been an oversight, as the Court actually reiterated approvingly the holding in Goodwin and its progeny in its recapitulation of the principles applicable to the case (at§68). Nevertheless, the contradictory statements that the Court makes once against demonstrate that the Goodwinjudgment has not been sufficiently internalized in Strasbourg, and may be seized on by governments in future litigation to make life harder for trans claimants. 

The problems with utilizing sexual orientation as an exclusionary criterion in the case of transgender marriages

From the beginning of my involvement after the Chamber’s ruling, I tried very hard to distinguish the applicant’s situation from that of a same-sex marriage seeking to get married (for more details about my strategy see my previous articles hereand here).  On the one hand, I was aware that the Court was not willing to change tack so soon after its latest ruling on same-sex marriage in Schalk and Kopf v Austria. On the other hand, it seemed to me that there were genuine and material distinctions between the two situations. Ultimately, the Court concluded sternly that regardless of the fact that the applicant had not advocated for same-sex marriage in general, the fact remained that her claim, if accepted, would lead to the existence of a same-sex marriage (at §70). In that respect, the findings from Schalk and Kopf, to the effect that Article 8 cannot be interpreted to impose on obligation on Contracting States to grant same sex couples access to marriage, at least not until the prevailing consensus against same sex marriage changed, also had to apply in Hämäläinen. Judge Ziemele dissenting interpreted the majority’s rationale in the same key – that “there has been no violation on account of the absence of a specific positive obligation to introduce legislation on same-sex marriages.”

Leaving aside the distinction between the acquired right to remain married and the presumptive right to get married, which goes to the heart of the case, I find it almost offensive that the applicant’s relationship should come to be defined exclusively on the basis of a criterion which is more or less irrelevant in this particular context – their ascribed sexual orientation. There has to be an element of private choice in sexual orientation, it cannot be ascribed to an individual by courts or administrative agencies. In other words, the price of escaping the box of gender, is to be boxed in another legal category applied almost by default – that of same-sex marriage. The dissenters in fact alluded to this aspect, when suggesting that the applicant’s situation was different from that of homosexual couples, and that therefore her relationship should have been treated differently:

In fact, the national legal order treats their situation like that of homosexuals. However, at least at the time of their entry into marriage, the applicant and her spouse were not homosexual partners. Even after the applicant’s gender reassignment, it is an oversimplification of the situation to treat her relationship as a homosexual one. In our view, the crucial question regarding the discrimination issue is whether the State has failed to differentiate between the applicant’s situation and that of a homosexual couple by failing to introduce appropriate exceptions to the rule debarring same-sex couples from the institution of marriage.

Ultimately, this judgment is another confirmation of the Court’s bias toward schematic and traditional family units, typically formed of (different-sex) couples and their minor children (for criticism of a recent judgment that also exemplifies this approach see HERE). The applicant’s relationship should qualify for equal protection not by virtue of the actual or presumed sexual orientation of the spouses assigned randomly by a court - whether homosexual, or heterosexual, or other -, but because it is a long, stable, loving relationship, not different in any relevant respects to that of any other married couple.

One final point. Some people expressed regret that Finland, of all countries where forced divorce is an issue, was the jurisdiction producing the case that made it to the Grand Chamber. Other countries, lacking the fall back option of registered partnership and the streamlined procedures that are available in Finland, would have been better candidates for a test case litigated at this level. Leaving aside the fact that strategic litigation includes a fair amount of opportunism, and that we did not really have a choice of countries to start with, I suggest somewhat counter-intuitively, that Finland was exactly the country that we needed, as it encapsulates neatly the essence of the demands made by trans people in the applicant’s position. This category of claimants usually want nothing short than preserving their marriage. To the extent that the case was brought against say, Italy, we could expect at most a finding of a violation of Article 8 on account of the absence of alternatives less restrictive than the dissolution of marriage.  Although this would be a positive outcome in that it would benefit same-sex couples, it would arguably still feel like a loss to partners in a transgender marriage, who would still have to give up their marriage as a prerequisite to legal gender recognition. In all likelihood, many couples would relinquish or postpone indefinitely gender recognition and continue their existence as de facto same-sex married couples. They would thus be pushed to inhabit a grey area of legality, appearing as married same-sex couples in countries prohibiting same sex marriages, whereas the trans spouse would identify publicly in their self identified gender, even if it would still not be recognised under the law.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the experience of trans rights litigation in the past may suggest that we should better look at Hämäläinen as a necessary step in a broader process of change, just as Christine Goodwin came after a series of disappointing trans rights judgments against the United Kingdom. The particular set-up in the United Kingdom came to define the Court’s jurisprudence on trans issues. As I argued elsewhere, this is now an inadequate framework, for at least two reasons – because of the different realities in countries other than the United Kingdom, particularly from Eastern Europe, and because of developments at the international level, emphasizing the autonomy of the individual to self-identify their gender, free from other requirements such as sterilization or forced divorce. As much as the Hämäläinen majority muddled the waters, the dissenters trailblazed an alternative path to a distinctive treatment of transgender claims in the future, and this may be the best outcome we could have hoped for at this particular moment.

Public hearing before the Grand Chamber in Gherghina v. Romania

January 28, 2015, 3:25 am

≫ Next: Rapid reaction to European Court judgment on sterilisation of trans people

≪ Previous: Hämäläinen v. Finland: A Story of Illusory Consensus and Lesser Families

$

0

0

In the good tradition of this blog, news come very late.

Take this for example, the Grand Chamber hearing in the case Gherghina v. Romania, which took place on 12 November 2014, which I have not yet reported on here, and which is my third Grand Chamber hearing in slightly longer than one year.

The case concerns the Romanian authorities' failure to ensure universities were accessible and that reasonable accommodation was offered to the applicant, a young man using a wheelchair. The hearing focused mostly on the existence and nature of remedies in Romania for the type of claims raised by the applicant, as well as on other interesting issues such as what constitutes acceptable reasonable accommodation, the implications of costs for characterising the applicant's claims or types of discrimination. I represented the applicant together with my dear friend Horatiu Rusu, lecturer in human rights at the Sibiu University. We expect to receive the judgment during the first half of 2015

The webcast of the hearing is available HERE.

Rapid reaction to European Court judgment on sterilisation of trans people

March 10, 2015, 3:53 am

≫ Next: Bataliny v Russia - possibly first judgment on human scientific experimentation (short case note)

≪ Previous: Public hearing before the Grand Chamber in Gherghina v. Romania

$

0

0

The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a good solid judgment today in the case YY v Turkey, concerning the inability of a trans man to access gender reassignment surgery, a precondition to legal gender recognition, on account of being still fertile.

The Court found a violation of Art 8, which turns on a peculiar feature of the Turkish law that requires persons seeking an authorisation to undergo genital surgery for the purposes of obtaining gender recognition, to prove that they are infertile, even before undergoing surgery. In most other relevant countries, sterilisation (whether alone, or as a part of a broader gender reassignment package) is a prerequisite to legal gender recognition, as opposed to being a precondition to gender reassignment leading to gender recognition as in Turkey. The Turkish government was not able to justify this requirement, which was thus held to be "unnecessary in a democratic society."

Interestingly, the Court undertook an extensive survey of national laws in the area, noted the trends towards abandoning sterilisation altogether, including by citing relevant Council of Europe legislation, although it stopped short from ruling out the sterilisation requirement in abstract, distinct from the particular set of facts before it.

Four concurring judges (so a majority of the Chamber!) would have preferred a more in-depth examination of the validity of the sterilisation requirement in abstract. This bodes well for future challenges provided that the right set of facts comes before the Court.

Bataliny v Russia - possibly first judgment on human scientific experimentation (short case note)

August 31, 2015, 4:37 am

≫ Next: Short statement on the publication of decision in Gherghina v. Romania case

≪ Previous: Rapid reaction to European Court judgment on sterilisation of trans people

$

0

0

Bataliny v Russia is another notable psychiatric detention case decided during the holiday period. Besides the usual litany of unlawful detention, lack of remedies and beatings, this may be the first time the court finds a violation of article 3 on account of non-consensual participation in a research programme for new antipsychotic medication. 

Its interesting the Court felt it was necessary to deploy all the heavy weaponry, citing the 1947 Nuremberg Codes prohibiting human experiments, the 1964 Helsinki Declaration, the MI Principles (extensively), the Oviedo Convention (extensively) and the CRPD (discretely). The Court's task was made considerably easier by conclusive evidence acknowledging that the applicant had been unnecessarily and unlawfully detained and that he had been subjected to tests for new antipsychotic drugs. 

The Court would not otherwise touch the use or abuse of antipsychotic medication in psychiatric hospitals with a bargepole, or engage in any meaningful review of medical necessity, which is why its new found zeal is this and other isolated cases is somewhat misleading.

Anyways, here you have it - Bataliny v Russia, (possibly) the first case on human scientific experimentation from the european court of human rights.

"The Court finds unacceptable, in the light of international standards, that a program of scientific research with new drugs be implemented without the consent of the subject submitted to the experimentation." (at para 90)

---

Short statement on the publication of decision in Gherghina v. Romania case

September 18, 2015, 7:48 am

≫ Next: Analiza critica a proiectului de lege "privind infiintarea mecanismelor prevazute de Conventia privind drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilitati"

≪ Previous: Bataliny v Russia - possibly first judgment on human scientific experimentation (short case note)

$

0

0

The European Court of Human Rights published today, rather unexpectedly, the judgment in the Grand Chamber case Gherghina v Romania, in which I represented the applicant, concerning the lack of accessibility and failure to provide reasonable accommodation to a wheelchair-using student. 

Unfortunately, the Court rejected our arguments to the effect that Romania lacks effective remedies allowing people with disabilities the chance to challenge non-compliance with accessibility duties. Accordingly, the Court declared the case inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 

While this is disheartening, I can only hope that on another day, the Court will find the resources to look beyond the surface and connect to the realities of being disabled in Romania, requiring a less formalistic approach, more attuned to the universal values that the Convention is supposed to protect. More detailed comments to follow.

The decision is available here.  

Analiza critica a proiectului de lege "privind infiintarea mecanismelor prevazute de Conventia privind drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilitati"

December 11, 2015, 6:30 am

≫ Next: ECtHR transgender rights complaint v. Romania/ Plangere la CEDO impotriva Romaniei privind drepturile persoanelor transgender

≪ Previous: Short statement on the publication of decision in Gherghina v. Romania case

$

0

0

Centrul de Resurse Juridice (CRJ) sprijina un proiect de lege “privind infiintarea mecanismelor prevazute de Conventia privind drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilitati” (“proiectul de lege”) aflat pe ordinea de zi a Senatului. Traseul legislativ al proiectului de lege, inclusiv forma initiatorului si expunerea de motive, sunt vizible AICI. CRJ, in colaborare cu Centrul de investigatii media, au realizat o campanie de sustinere a acestui proiect intitulata “Lagarele dintre noi” care include o caravana fotografica, o pagina Facebook, o petitie, cat si un program pentru jurnalisti dispusi sa scrie despre acest subiect. In acest memoriu imi propun un inceput de analiza critica a proiectului de lege, avand in vedere lipsa unei dezbateri substantiale atat la momentul redactarii sale, cat si pe traseul sau parlamentar, dar si miza sa covarsitoare pentru persoanele cu dizabilitati din institutii si din comunitate.

Voi examina pentru inceput geneza si temeiul legal al acestui proiect de lege. El este similar unor proiecte mai vechi care vizau intemeierea mecanismului preventiv impotriva torturii conform Protocolului Optional al Conventiei ONU impotriva Torturii (OPCAT), sprijinit de o coalitie ceva mai diversa de organizatii neguvernmentale si care priveau toate locurile de detentie, nu numai institutiile rezidentiale pentru persoane cu dizabilitati. O data ce Guvernul a optat sa incredinteze functia de monitorizare Avocatului Poporului (AP), aceste proiecte de lege au devenit caduce. CRJ a reimpachetat proiectul existent si a revendicat ca temei legal functia de monitorizare conform Art 33§2 al Conventiei ONU pentru Drepturile Persoanelor cu Dizabilitati (CRPD), un artificiu care a servit ca pretext pentru a ignora noile realitati si a continua campania pe spatele/in beneficiul persoanelor cu dizabilitati. Art. 33 CRPD impune Statelor Parti sa intemeieze o structura complexa de monitorizare a obligatiilor ce le revin, care include “puncte focale” si unul sau mai multe mecanisme independente.

Proiectul de lege pretinde ca satisface in intregime obligatiile ce reies din Art. 33§2 (evident chiar din titlu: “Lege privind infiintarea mecanimselor prevazute de CRPD”). Cu toate acestea,  persoanele inchise in institutii sunt doar unul din grupurile vizate de CRPD, iar monitorizarea locurilor de detentie doar o parte din obligatiile ce le incumba statelor sub CRPD. Prin urmare, mecanismul preconizat nu satisface cerintele Art. 33§2 CRPD. Pe de o parte, statul roman a incredintat deja functia de monitorizare IRDO, o organizatie fantoma care ii este aservita. Pe de alta parte, detaliile arhitecturii de monitorizare la nivel national a obligatiilor derivate din CRPD nu pot fi stabilite decat in urma unui proces de negociere cu toate entitatile relevante, in principal persoanele cu dizabilitati insele. Ori proiectul de lege nu a fost rezultatul unor dezbateri inclusive, ci impus de un singur ONG care nu are in componenta persoane cu dizabilitati, prezentand riscul compromiterii pe termen lung a implementarii CRPD in Romania.

Nu imi propun aici o analiza pe articole, care altfel nu ar fi lipsita de interes. Cu toate acestea, exista cel putin doua prevederi care ridica probleme aditionale de legalitate.

Proiectul de lege jongleaza in mod inacceptabil cu notiune de “reprezentare”  (sau, dupa caz, ”calitate procesuala activa”) care s-a dovedit a fi foarte controversata in literatura de specialitate si practica din alte tari. Indeosebi, Art. 4§2 preia aproape literal limbajul §161 al hotararii CEDO Campeanu v Romania, conferind calitate procesuala activa organizatiilor neguvernamentale cu scopul de a furniza reprezentare independenta persoanelor cu dizabilitati in fata unei instante sau a oricarui organism independent. Proiectul de lege falsifica intelesul hotararii Campeanu, de la care se revendica conform expunerii de motive, sugerand ca implicarea organizatiilor neguvernamentale epuizeaza obligatia de asigura reprezentare ‘independenta’ rezidentilor din institutii. De fapt, CEDO nu se refera decat in subsidiar si in anumite circumstante bine delimitate la organizatiile neguvernamentale, atunci cand statul nu asigura o modalitate adecvata de asistenta juridica persoanelor din institutii. Art. 4§2 permite organizatiilor neguvernmentale sa “reprezinte” victimele abuzurilor, dar omite sa raspunda la intrebari esentiale precum – ce califica ONG-urile sa reprezinte victimele? In ce consta ‘reprezentarea’ – substituire, suport sau ambele? Cine verifica standardele activitatii de reprezentare? Este necesar consimtamantul ‘beneficiarului’? Ce se intampla daca persoana in cauza nu are capacitatea de a consimti? Cum poate persoana contesta interventia sau prestatia ‘reprezentantului’? samd. Aceste intrebari nu sunt pur teoretice ci dimpotriva au o insemnatate practica covarsitoare.  Mai mult decat atat, Art. 12(i) confera mecanismului insusi “calitatea procesuala activa in apararea drepturilor si intereselor legitime” calificata insa de precizarea introductiva conform careia aceasta functie este alocata in “scopul indeplinirii atributiilor de monitorizare.” Aceasta prevedere plaseaza mecanismul intr-un evident si periculos conflict de rol, avand in vedere atributiile cuprinzatare ce ii sunt acordate (de ex. verifica legalitatea prezentei persoanelor cu dizabilitati in institutii). In sfarsit, intrebarile de mai sus privind calitatea activitatii de reprezentare se aplica mutatis mutandis si mecanismului. Fiind excesiv de vagi, potential contradictorii si necorelate nu dispozitii privind accesul la justitie a persoanelor cu dizabilitati din alte legi, apreciez ca aceste prevederi sunt contrare Art. 6 CEDO si Art. 13 CRPD. De asemenea, consider riscul real ca acest proiect de lege sa compromita potentialul de reforma al hotararii Campeanu v Romania un afront personal, avand in vedere cat am muncit in acest caz.

Proiectul de lege simplifica impermisibil chestiunile spinoase legate de calificarea unei situatii drept ‘privare de libertate.’ Mecanismul de monitorizare isi propune sa “verifice legalitatea prezentei persoanelor cu dizabilitati” in institutiile vizate de lege (Art. 4§1(c)), indiferent ca este vorba de institutii de protectie sociala sau de spitale psihiatrice, cu regimuri juridice diferite. Indeosebi ipoteza plasamentului in institutii de ocrotire sociala, eventual cu permisiunea tutorelui interzisului, care nu este considerata indeobste ca fiind privativa de libertate potrivit dreptului intern ridica probleme speciale. Care este temeiul juridic pentru interventia mecanismului? Daca este vorba de dreptul intern, lipsit de garantii impotriva detentiei arbitrare, atunci mecanismul nu ar face decat sa acopere o ilegalitate, consolidand status-quo-ul. Daca este vorba de dreptul international, concluzia care se impune este ca mecanismul se substituie in fapt controlului judiciar obligatoriu potrivit Art. 5§4 CEDO. Lasand la o parte chestiunea de a sti daca mecanismul are un caracter judiciar satisfacand conditiile CEDO (nu are), este intr-adevar in interesul persoanelor cu dizabilitati sa incredintam verificarea legalitatii detentiei in institutii unei entitati administrative, fie ea 'independenta'? Daca un astfel de mecanism trece eu voi fi primul care voi contesta legalitatea sa din perspectiva Art. 5 CEDO. De remarcat si faptul ca proiectul de lege este contradictoriu in relatia sa cu CRPD– pe de o parte se legitimeaza prin apelul la aceasta conventie, pe de alta parte se aplica persoanelor cu dizabilitati aflate in locuri inchise. Astfel proiectul omite faptul ca CRPD nu permite detentia bazata pe criteriul dizabilitatii, acoperind in mod potential o ilegalitate. Detentia intr-o institutie rezervata persoanelor cu dizabilitati este ilegala ab initio, prin urmare operatiunea de verificare a legalitatii acestei situatii este lipsita de sens.

Faciliteaza cu adevarat acest mecanism accesul la justitie a persoanelor cu dizabilitati, asa cum pretind promotorii sai? In cel mai bun caz, acest mecanism va forma o interfata relativ prietenoasa intre persoanele din institutii si sistemul de justitie. Eu sunt pesimist din motivele enumerate mai sus, insa si in aceasta situatie trebuie amintit faptul ca in ultima instanta responsabilitatea de a cerceta si pedepsi abuzurile din institutii revine parchetelor si instantelor. Ori eu nu cunosc nici macar un singur caz in care o instanta sa fi pedepsit vreunul din sutele de abuzuri de o gravitate exceptionala din institutii care au ajuns in atentia presei in ultimii 10-20 de ani. Aceasta problema subzista si nu va disparea, dar este, inca o data, trecuta cu vederea de promotorii legii. In cel mai rau caz, dar, in opinia mea, si cel mai probabil, mecanismul se va transforma intr-o alta bucla in sistem, unde doleantele legitime ale persoanelor cu dizabilitati se vor pierde sau vor fi neutralizate, servind ca alibi pentru pastrarea status-quo-ului si deresponsabilizand si mai mult instantele din pozitia lor de forum legitim si exclusiv de rezolvare a chestiunilor legate de astfel de abuzuri grave.

Initiatorii legii supraestimeaza in mod oportunist sansele crearii unui mecanism cu adevarat independent cu mandat de supraveghere a respectarii drepturilor omului in Romania. Este un fapt incontestabil ca nu avem nici o institutie independenta/autonoma in Romania care sa se conformeze cu Principiile de la Paris si care sa fie recunoscuta ca atare. CNCD-ul si AP-ul, desi teoretic independente, sunt in realitate entitati ineficiente si colonizate de stat. Factorii de presiune care sa asigure implementarea adecvata a legii sunt relativ nesemnificativi: CRPD nu dispune de nici un instrument coercitiv pentru a asigura socializarea statelor recalcitrante, forta politica a persoanelor cu dizabilitati in genere, si a celor din institutii in special, este inexistenta, capacitatea de influenta a societatii civile implicate in domeniu este  foarte limitata. Tocmai din acest motiv, persoanele cu dizabilitati ar trebui sa se alinieze cu grupuri si aliante mai cuprinzatoare ale caror interese coincid – pacientii, utilizatorii de servicii sociale etc. In aceste conditii, riscul ca acest proiect de lege sa fie deturnat creand un alt mecanism aservit statului este major si nu poate fi ignorat.

Mecanismul preconizat dubleaza atributiile unor institutii existente. Am in vedere in principal AP, care a preluat functia de monitorizare a locurilor de detentie in baza OPCAT. AP a inceput recent activitatea de monitorizare, cu echipe mixte care includ reprezentanti ai societatii civile si asociatiilor profesionale cu atributii in domeniu, vizitand intre altele stabilimente care gazduiesc persoane cu dizabilitati si publicand rapoarte cel putin decente. Desigur, subzista in continuare dubii rezonabile cu privire la modul in care AP isi duce la indeplinire mandatul, dar in acelasi timp este incontestabil faptul ca ei exercita functii de monitorizare mai mult sau mai putin identice cu cele ale mecanismului preconizat, ca a fost recunoscut ca atare de diverse institutii internationale incluzand Comitetul impotriva Torturii (CAT) si ca beneficiaza, cel putin pe hartie, de garantii de independenta institutionala. CNCD-ul are competenta teoretica de a primi plangeri din partea persoanelor cu dizabilitati si de a efectua investigatii in institutii, chiar daca in practica activitatea lor in acest domeniu este nesemnificativa. Inspectia Sociala, organism subordonat Guvernului, monitorizeaza calitatea serviciilor sociale, inclusiv institutiile rezidentiale pentru persoane cu dizabilitati. Infiintarea unui nou mecanism de monitorizare apare ca fiind problematica in conditiile in care exista deja o increngatura de institutii cu atributii similare. Este necesara mai intai clarificarea relatiilor intre aceste mecanisme si eventualelor conflictele de competenta, urmarindu-se in acelasi timp alocarea rationala a unor resurse bugetare finite, avand in vedere si faptul ca ca acest sector sufera deja de subfinantare/management financiar deficitar. Chestiunea suprapunerii de atributii a fost ridicata in mod repetat in dezbaterile din Parlament dar nu a fost elucidata niciodata de suporterii proiectului de lege. Mai mult decat atat, ostilitatea manifesta a CRJ fata de AP sugereaza teama de a pierde un program lucrativ si o clientela captiva si docila, respectiv persoanele inchise in institutii.

Infiintarea unui mecanism dedicat in mod special locurilor inchise pentru persoanele cu dizabilitati este o eroare tactica majora, care contravine ethosului egalitar si inclusiv al CRPD. Aceasta pentru ca proiectul de lege ar crea o alta structura segregata dedicata special persoanelor cu dizabilitati. In loc, aceasta functie ar trebui sa fie incredintata unei institutii inclusive de monitorizare, fie ca aceasta ar viza calitatea serviciilor sociale, locurile de detentie in genere, calitatea actului medical etc. Crearea unei alte structuri separate consolideaza si legitimeaza sistemul institutional segregat. In plus, se creaza astfel inca un obstacol in calea dezinstitutionalizarii, din moment ce acest deziderat contravine mandatului mecanismului de monitorizare, care are ca premiza prezervarea sistemului institutional (mecanismul monitorizeza, nu desfiinteaza sistemul).

Folosind imagini grafice si cifre brute care denota dimensiunea fenomenului violentei institutionalizate impotriva persoanelor cu dizabilitati din locuri inchise, campania Lagarele dintre noi a starnit, pe buna dreptate, indignarea multor cetateni. CRJ a deturnat energia creata in urma acestei campanii catre petitia adresata Parlamentului pentru adoptarea proiectului de lege. Daca nimeni nu contesta gravotatea problemei descrise, nu rezulta de nicaieri ca mecanismul este solutia optima. campania “Lagarele dintre noi” a supraestimat in mod constant capacitatea acestui mecanism de a rezolva problemele majore din sistemul institutional, inducandu-si astfel in eroare suporterii si publicul. Unul din sloganele campaniei “Semneaza petitia si elibereaza-i din lagare” este un exemplu elocvent in acest sens, avand in vedere lipsa completa de realism a acestei viziuni. Alte mesaje alese la intamplare contin fracturi logice evidente, portretizand mecanismul ca un panaceu la toate problemele pe care le intampina nefericitii din institutii:

 

Astfel, proiectul de lege oculteaza problemele reale ale rezidentilor din institutii, incluzand sistemul institutional de ingrijire si tratament insusi, lipsa dezinstitutionalizarii (care nu este mentionata nici macar o singura data in textul proiectului), lipsa suportului pentru traiul in comunitate, stereotipuri si stigma larg impartasite in imaginarul popular, un sistem care privilegiaza interdictia ca metoda de ‘protectie’ a persoanelor cu dizablitati etc. Distorsionand realitatea problemelor din institutii, proiectul de lege si campania aferenta compromite sansele unei reforme serioase a sistemului.

In realitate, justificarea proiectului de lege nu se regaseste in nevoile reale ale persoanelor cu dizabilitati, ci in interesele tranzitorii ale CRJ si abilitatile staffului acesteia. Utilizatorii si supravietuitorii sistemului psihiatric si de asistenta sociala nu au fost consultati si nu sunt implicati in campanie, persoanele cu dizabilitati apar in materialele de campanie exclusiv ca victime anonime si neputincioase, materialele de presa aferente sunt excesiv de medicalizate (vezi de exemplu articolul cu titlul neverosimil “Condamnati la nebunie”), procesul de consultare care este de esenta CRPD-ului nu a fost niciodata realizat cu adevarat, criticii sunt condamnati ca retrograzi si trecuti sub tacere. Aceste neajunsuri sunt cu atat mai grave cu cat CRJ si asociatii ei sunt total nereprezentativi pentru segremntul de populatie pe care pretind ca il reprezinta. Lipsa de reprezentativitate acutizeaza gravitatea sustinerilor exagerate privind natura si potentialul mecanismului, dar si lipsa unui model de tragere la raspundere a CRJ in cazul probabil in care mecanismul se va dovedi o greseala grava. 

In concluzie, proiectul de lege este deficitar din mai multe motive. Unu, proiectul de lege incalca Art. 33§2 CRPD, cu consecinte care se vor resfrange asupra tuturor persoanelor cu dizabilitati din Romania, nu numai cele din institutii. Doi, include prevederi foarte problematice care au potentialul de a compromite garantiile impotriva detentiei arbitrare si pentru asigurarea accesului la justitie conform CEDO si CRPD. Trei, denatureaza continutul hotararii Campeanu v Romania si compromite potentialul ei de reforma. Patru, proiectul de lege implica riscul real al crearii unui alt mecanism ineficace care conserva status-quo-ul si derobeaza parchetele si instantele de obligatiile pe care le au catre persoanele cu dizabilitati. Cinci, atributiile mecanismului preconizat se suprapun cu cele ale altor institutii si agentii guvernamentale, cu potential real de risipa si confuzie. Sase, crearea unui alt mecanism separat dedicat in exclusivitate persoanelor cu dizabilitati consolideaza sistemul institutional de ingrijire si tratement. Sapte, promotorii proiectului de lege au indus in eroare publicul cu privire la natura mecanismului propus, supraestimand cu rea credinta capacitatea sa de a rezolva problemele din sistem. Mai mult decat atat, atentia exclusiva asupra mecanismului compromite posibilitatea diagnosticarii realiste a problemelor din sistem, si implicit, sansele unei reforme reale in viitorul apropiat. In ultimul rand, proiectul de lege sufera fundamental prin lipsa implicarii persoanelor afectate direct, precum si prin imagistica folosita, a caror protagonisti sunt persoane invizibile, neputincioase si dependente, de natura a perpetua sterotipurile populare si a compromite reintegrarea lor in societate. Din moment ce contradictiile si problemele proiectului sunt imposibil de rectificat, solicit retragerea de urgenta a proiectului de pe ordinea de zi a Senatului. 

Constantin Cojocariu este avocat cu expertiza recunoscuta pe plan international in drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilitati. A reprezentat reclamantii in numeroase cauze importante la CEDO impotriva mai multor tari, inclusiv Campeanu impotriva Romaniei. Ultima sa publicatie de specialitate este "Hit and Miss: Procedural accommodations of applicants with mental disabilities to the European Court of Human Rights," in "Research Companion on Disability Law," Ashgate, 2015 (in curs de aparitie). Constantin are un LLM in Human Rights de la Universitatea Central Europeana, Budapesta.

ECtHR transgender rights complaint v. Romania/ Plangere la CEDO impotriva Romaniei privind drepturile persoanelor transgender

December 28, 2015, 5:24 am

≫ Next: European Court delivers landmark judgment in disability discrimination case

≪ Previous: Analiza critica a proiectului de lege "privind infiintarea mecanismelor prevazute de Conventia privind drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilitati"

$

0

0

Finished and sent last gasp application against Romania to the European Court of Human Rights, on behalf of a transgender person complaining about the absence of adequate procedures for legal gender recognition and about being forced to undergo gender reassignment surgery. In Romania, transgender persons need to go to court to obtain documents that correctly identify their gender identity, but, with rules that are confusing and patchy, the procedure is a lottery - lengthy, arbitrary and humiliating. This presumably is the first transgender rights complaint against Romania at the ECtHR and others will follow.

Am expediat, pe ultima suta de metri inainte de sarbatori, o plangere impotriva Romaniei la CEDO privind lipsa unei proceduri adecvate pentru recunoasterea juridica a identitatii de gen precum si impotriva cerintei abuzive a efectuarii operatiei chirurgicale de reatribuire a sexului. In Romania, regulile in domeniu sunt confuze si lacunare, iar procedura in fata instantelor functioneaza ca o loterie - de lunga durata, traumatizanta si arbitrara. Aceasta este probabil prima plangere impotriva Romaniei la CEDO privind drepturile persoanelor transgender, altele probabil ca vor urma.

European Court delivers landmark judgment in disability discrimination case

March 28, 2016, 12:04 pm

≫ Next: New publication on disability and access to justice

≪ Previous: ECtHR transgender rights complaint v. Romania/ Plangere la CEDO impotriva Romaniei privind drepturile persoanelor transgender

$

0

0

On 22 March 2016, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a significant judgment in the case Guberina v. Croatia, concerning the discriminatory application of legal provisions in the area of taxation. The applicant in the case was the father of a severely disabled child, who used to live on the third floor of an apartment building that was inaccessible, due to lacking an elevator. Considering how difficult access to the building was, the applicant and his family sold the flat and bought a house that was fully accessible. 

The applicant requested to be exempted from paying the tax normally applicable to the purchase of a new property. He relied on a legal provision in Croatian law that granted such exemptions to those who bought a new property in order to solve their “housing needs”, in the sense that they did not already own a property with “basic infrastructure” and that “satisfied hygiene and technical requirements.” The applicant argued that since his old flat was inaccessible, it did not satisfy his family’s “housing needs” and that accessibility was a feature of “basic infrastructure.” However, national authorities and courts decided that the old flat possessed all basic infrastructure features and summarily dismissed the applicant’s request, without considering his son’s particular circumstances.

To start with, the European Court of Human Rights addressed the question of whether the applicant could claim discrimination based on his son’s disability. The Court clarified, for the first time in its jurisprudence, that “the alleged discriminatory treatment of the applicant on account of the disability of his child, with whom he has close personal links and for whom he provides care, is a form of disability based discrimination covered by Article 14 of the Convention.”

The Court agreed with the applicant in that accessibility was an element of basic infrastructure. In doing so, it highlighted the importance of accessibility to people with disabilities as a key to unlocking access to other fundamental rights:

“[lack of accessibility] severely impaired [the applicant’s] son’s mobility and consequently threatened his personal development and the ability to reach his maximum potential, making it extremely difficult for him to fully participate in the community and children’s educative, cultural and social activities. The absence of a lift must have impeded the quality of living of the applicant’s family and in particular his son to a similar extent that an able-bodied person would experience by, for example, having a flat on the third floor of a residential building without appropriate access to it or by having an impaired access to the relevant public utilities.”

The Court held that the authorities interpreted the meaning of “basic infrastructure" too restrictively, failing to take into account the specific needs of the applicant and his family. This was all the more so as Croatia was a party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and therefore Croatian authorities were under an obligation to take into consideration its principles, including “reasonable accommodation, accessibility and non-discrimination against persons with disabilities with regard to their full and equal participation in all aspects of social life.” The Court concluded that there was a breach of Article 14 of the European Convention (prohibition of discrimination) together with Article 1 of its Protocol 1 (right to property).

The Court’s robust approach in Guberina is remarkable, considering its generally conservative position in relation to disability, as well as the fact that housing and taxation are generally seen as areas of privileged State competence. This is the first case in which the Court has affirmed the importance of accessibility in the lives of persons with disabilities, leading to a finding of a breach of the Convention. This is also one of the very few judgments containing a fully-fledged argumentation under Art. 14 of the Convention prohibiting discrimination, introducing concepts such as ‘discrimination by association’ and ‘indirect discrimination’ for the first time in a disability context.  Finally, the Court’s willingness to rely on the CRPD in order to interpret the States’ obligations under the European Convention is noteworthy. The message that this case sends is that state institutions should actively consider the implications of seemingly neutral legal provisions on the lives of people with disabilities and make the necessary changes accordingly, in order to ensure their social inclusion and avoid discrimination.

The judgment is available at this link.

Vesna Terhaj, a Croatian lawyer, and Constantin Cojocariu, a London-based Romanian lawyer, represented the applicant in his case before the Strasbourg court.

New publication on disability and access to justice

July 22, 2016, 10:59 am

≫ Next: Persoanele trans – de la faza de ‘experiment inedit’, de ‘incalcare a ordinii publice’ la cea de titulari de drepturi fundamentale - un dosar rezolvat recent in instantele romane

≪ Previous: European Court delivers landmark judgment in disability discrimination case

$

0

0

I am honoured to have an article published in the Routledge Handbook of Disability Law and Human Rights, along with contributions from other well-known academics specialising in disability rights, finally out now.

Constantin Cojocariu - Hit and Miss: Procedural Accommodations Ensuring the Effective Access of People with Mental Disabilities to the European Court of Human Rights

Here is the introduction of the article: 

Persons with mental disabilities in Eastern Europe suffer from high and well-documented rates of discrimination and abuse, which are often embedded in the law. Phenomena such as large-scale institutionalization or denial of legal capacity are frequently described as benevolent measures aimed at ensuring the welfare of those concerned. The advent of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CRPD’), widely ratified across Europe, highlighted these structural inequities and framed them as violations of basic human rights. The European Court of Human Rights (“hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court’), as the preeminent regional mechanism for human rights protection, would appear to hold great potential for those seeking to challenge the status quo and achieve systemic change. However, its output on disability rights to date has been quite limited and rather disappointing. The physical, social and economic barriers that hinder access to justice at all levels of the judicial system may at least partially explain this dearth of jurisprudence. At the same time, many disability cases that do reach the Court are dismissed on admissibility grounds, revealing a lack of comprehension on the part of the Strasbourg judges of the specificity of disability rights claims, or result in judgments that often replicate and legitimize the oppressive narratives and structural discrimination that are prevalent at the national level. A close inspection of the Court’s jurisprudence reveals how procedural devices such as “standing”, “material scope”, “legal representation”, “margin of appreciation”, “exhaustion of domestic remedies” have been used to render disability claims non-justiciable under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention”).  

This article examines recent jurisprudential developments on disability rights in an attempt to decipher whether disabled people benefit from “practical and effective” access to the Court. The relevant reference point is Article 13 of the CRPD on access to justice, which requires States Parties to “ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the provision of procedural […] accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role […] in all legal proceedings.” For its part, the Court has also emphasized that “special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves.” This article offers a practitioner’s perspective, based on the author’s ten-year experience of litigating high profile disability cases before the Court.

The first part of the article examines the concept of  “de facto representation” introduced for the first time recently in the case Câmpeanu v. Romania, and its potential implications for proxies seeking to introduce complaints on behalf of people with disabilities suffering from abuse, lacking relatives or other guardians and who are unable to instruct a lawyer. The second part of the article explores the manner in which the Court deals with disabled applicants unable to secure adequate legal representation. The Court’s practice in this respect has been quite diverse, revealing a deeper ambivalence in its jurisprudence towards measures that interfere with a person’s legal capacity in the form of partial or plenary guardianship. Finally, the last part looks more closely at some of the recent changes in the Court’s procedure, and in particular the ongoing move to tighten as well as enforce more strictly the admissibility criteria for individual petitions, likely to have a disproportionate impact on disabled applicants.

Persoanele trans – de la faza de ‘experiment inedit’, de ‘incalcare a ordinii publice’ la cea de titulari de drepturi fundamentale - un dosar rezolvat recent in instantele romane

July 29, 2016, 6:51 am

≫ Next: Good judgment on the right to free speech of LGBT communities

≪ Previous: New publication on disability and access to justice

$

0

0

Voi prezenta pe scurt istoria unui caz rezolvat recent de instantele romane, privind recunoasterea in Romania a modificarilor de stare civila intervenite in Italia in favoarea unui barbat trans roman, cu cateva observatii scurte la final. 

Reclamantul X este un barbat trans, cetatean roman, care a emigrat in Italia. Printr-o hotarare pronuntata in 2008, Tribunalul Torino i-a autorizat cererea de a efectua un tratament de reatribuire chirurgicala a sexului. Dupa efectuarea acestui tratament, in cursul anului 2009, aceeasi instanta a pronuntat o hotarare prin care a aprobat cererea reclamantului de schimbare a sexului si a prenumelui in registrele de stare civila italiene. Ca urmare, Primaria orasului Torino a transcris actul de nastere romanesc si a inscris mentiunile necesare cu privire la sex si prenume. Ulterior, reclamantul a obtinut un act de identitate italian continand noile elemente de identitate.

Reclamantul a solicitat initial Serviciului de stare civila Y introducerea pe cale administrativa in registrul de stare civila roman a modificarilor survenite cu privire la prenume si sex in Italia. Serviciul de stare civila a comunicat cererea sa serviciului specializat din Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, care a raspuns in sensul ca, potrivit Regulamentului CE nr. 2201/2003 privind competenta, recunoasterea si executarea hotararilor judecatoresti in materie matrimoniala si in material raspundereii parintesti, se impune mai intai recunoasterea sentintelor de catre un tribunal, urmand ca ulterior sa se procedeze la inscrierea modificarilor in cauza in registrul de stare civila.

Ulterior, reclamantul a introdus o cerere in judecata pe rolul Tribunalului Y, solicitand Servicului de stare civila Y (intimatul) recunoasterea celor doua sentinte civile ale Tribunalului Torino si mentionarea modificarilor survenite in Italia pe actul sau de nastere, atribuirea unui cod numeric personal, ca si eliberarea unui nou certificat de nastere. Reclamantul a aratat ca actele de identitate romanesti expirasera si ca in acelasi timp cartea de identitate italiana era valabila doar pe teritoriul Italiei. Prin urmare, reclamantul nu avea posibilitatea sa calatoreasca in Romania pentru a-si vizita familia si prietenii. Pe de alta parte, el nu putea nici trimite o procura pentru intocmirea unor noi acte de identitate avand in vedere ca elementele de identitate pe care le avea in Italia nu coincideau cu cele inscrise in registrele de stare civila romane.

In motivarea sa, Tribunalul a subliniat ca instanta italiana nu a tinut seama de faptul ca reclamantul era cetatean roman, un element de extraneitate care ar fi trebuit sa atraga incidenta Regulamentului (CE) nr. 44/2001 privind competenta judiciara, recunoasterea si executarea hotararilor in materie civila si comerciala. Potrivit dispozitiilor relevante din acest Regulament, in conjunctie cu Art. 1079§1 Cod civil, cererea de autorizarea a schimbarii de sex e de competenta exclusiva a instantei romane, singura care putea “verifica date de fapt concrete din istoria personala a reclamantului, date relevante in solutionarea cererii sale, prin audierea, spre exemplu, a unor martori care il cunosteau inca din copilarie”. Tribunalul a apreciat ca “in lipsa unor informatii ample privind evolutia comportamentala si de ordin psihic a reclamant[ului], profundele modificari prin care acesta urma sa treaca si prin care a si trecut par a fi fost privite de catre instanta straina un simplu experiment complex, poate inedit, dar un experiment.” In acest sens, decizia de a modifica registrele de stare civila italiene nu poate avea nici un efect asupra inregistrarilor de stare civila efectuate in registrele publice romanesti. Desi a recunoscut ca reclamantul sufera de unele ‘inconveniente’, Tribunalul a facut pe de alta parte urmatoarele observatii:

“[acesta] nu se putea folosi pe teritoriul Romaniei de o alta identitate referitoare la sex decat cea decurgand din actele de stare civila romanesti insa incalcarea normelor de ordine publica nu poate fi justificata nici de necunoasterea legii (nemo censetur ignorare legem) si nici de argumentul unui fapt ireversibil deja implinit, ale carui consecinte reclamanta, sesizand o instanta necompetenta, cel mai probabil considerata mai ingaduitoare, si le-a asumat in mod exclusiv si deliberat. Fara a specula asupra solutiei pe care instantele romane ar fi pronuntat-o in cazul in care ar fi fost sesizate cu cererea reclamantei de autorizare a schimbarii de sex, instanta apreciaza ca admiterea cererii de recunoastere a hotararii pronuntate de o instanta necompetenta ar constitui un precedent perculos data fiind importanta normelor ocrotite.”

In consecinta, printr-o hotarare pronuntata pe 18 septembrie 2015, Tribunalul Y a respins actiunea ca nefondata.

Curtea de Apel, sesizata cu apelul reclamanatului, a decis ca Regulamentul CE 44/2001 nu este aplicabil in cauza, avand vedere definitia sferei sale materiale in Art. 2§1: “prezentul regulament nu se aplica pentru starea si capacitatea persoanelor fizice[…].” In continuare, Curtea a decis ca in speta sunt intrunite conditiile cumulative ale Art. 1096§1 Cod procedura civila, respectiv: hotararile a caror recunoastere se solicita sunt definitive potrivit legii statului unde au fost pronuntate, instanta care a pronuntat-o a avut, potrivit legii statului de sediu, competenta sa judece procesul si exista reciprocitate in ceea ce priveste efectele hotararilor straine intre Romania si statul instantei care a pronuntat hotararea. Mai mult decat atat, instanta a constatat ca in speta nu este incident vreun motiv de refuz al recunoasterii dintre cele mentionate in Art. 1097 Cod procedura civila. Indeosebi, cele doua hotarari italiene nu sunt contrare ordinii publice de drept international roman, avand in vedere faptul ca identitatea de gen este un aspect fundamental al dreptului la viata privata protejat de Art. 8 CEDO, iar CJUE a decis in mai multe cazuri ca discriminarea pe criteriul reatribuirii de gen este un aspect al discriminarii pe criteriul de sex. Prin urmare, printr-o decizie pronuntata pe 23 mai 2016, Curtea de Apel a admis apelul declarat de reclamant dispunand recunoasterea pe teritoriul Romaniei a hotararilor italiene in cauza.

Fara a comenta hotararile celor doua instante, iata cateva observatii succinte pe final. In primul rand, reclamantul a fost reprezentat in instanta de Domnul avocat Ciprian Finica, in timp ce eu am pus umarul la elaborarea argumentelor in apel. In al doilea rand, in apel am incercat trimiterea unor intrebari preliminare CJUE intemeiate pe legislatia UE privind dreptul la libera circulatie. Nu am reusit de aceasta data, pentru un pretext oarecum bizar. Oricum, ramane sa folosim argumentele pe care le-am construit acum cu alta ocazie. In al treilea rand, este de mentionat ca exista cel putin o alta hotarare de exequatur in aceeasi materie, prin care un alt tribunal roman a recunoscut o hotarare pronuntata in Olanda, facand paradoxal aplicarea Regulamentului 44/2001, declarat inaplicabil in prezenta speta. Pe de alta parte, aceasta cauza ar fi, cel putin dupa stiinta mea, prima in care o instanta romaneasca constata ca regulile privind schimbarea juridica a sexului in acte tine de ordinea publica de drept international roman, in contexul unei motivari foarte ostile. In fine, daca aceasta cauza priveste o persoana trans care a efectuat operatia chirurgicala de reatribuire de gen, ar fi deosebit de interesant sa testam apele cu un caz implicand o persoana care si-a schimbat actele FARA a efectua aceasta procedura medicala, beneficiind de reformele care au avut loc in aceasta privinta in mai multe tari europene. In acest sens, daca exista cineva cu acest profil care vrea sa-si schimbe actele in Romania si are nevoie de ajutor, il invit sa ma contacteze.

Good judgment on the right to free speech of LGBT communities

November 22, 2016, 4:48 am

≫ Next: Persoanele cu dizabilitati in fata Curtii Constitutionale a Romaniei

≪ Previous: Persoanele trans – de la faza de ‘experiment inedit’, de ‘incalcare a ordinii publice’ la cea de titulari de drepturi fundamentale - un dosar rezolvat recent in instantele romane

$

0

0

The Court delivered (finally!) a decent judgment in a case I have been involved in - KAOS GL v. Turkey - concerning the restrictions placed on a magazine published by well known LGBT organisation discussing pornography and its place in the lives of LGBT people, justified on the basis of criminal provisions banning obscene publications from public exposure. 

Violation of the freedom of expression due to restriction being totally disproportionate as well as sloppy reasoning. Important affirmation of right of LGBT communities to participate in public debate with issues related to their identity. 

Nevertheless, the court's view that some kinky paintings reproduced in the magazine (including a metaphorical depiction of painter having sex with his alter ego) may potentially justify some degree of censorship, without meaningful analysis, as well as its glossing over extensive evidence of this case being part of a wider campaign by Turkish authorities to stifle LGBT activism, were disappointing.

All in all, an ok-enough ruling that may provide some momentary respite to hard-pressed activists in Turkey.

Link to judgment: HERE

Link to INTERIGHTS case page with additional info: HERE

---

Persoanele cu dizabilitati in fata Curtii Constitutionale a Romaniei

March 22, 2017, 2:22 pm

≫ Next: Important development in the area of mental health detention from the European Court of Human Rights

≪ Previous: Good judgment on the right to free speech of LGBT communities

$

0

0

Pe 6 februarie 2017, Tribunalul Buzau a sesizat Curtea Constitutionala cu o cerere de examinare a constitutionalitatii Articolului 164§1 din Codul Civil privind procedura punerii sub interdictie. Litigiul principal se refera la o cerere de punere sub interdictie introdusa de Spitalul Psihiatric Sapoca din Judetul Buzau, care vizeaza unui pacient diagnosticat cu schizofrenie, internat fortat in diverse spitale psihiatrice de maxima siguranta incepand din 2001. Cererea aflata pe rolul Curtii Constitutionale (Dosar nr. 695D/2017) reprezinta o sansa pentru reexaminarea unei institutii – punerea sub interdictie – anacronice, profund nedrepte si aflata in contradictie flagranta cu drepturile fundamentale ale omului. Acest articol isi propune sa prezinte pe scurt motivele pentru care contest aceasta institutie, reprezentand in acelasi timp un apel la mobilizare in sustinerea clientului meu adresat societatii civile interesate de protectia drepturilor omului.

Procedura punerii sub interdictie consta in privarea de capacitatea de exercitiu a persoanelor cu probleme de sanatate mintala percepute ca fiind incapabile de a-si apara interesele, si punerea lor sub tutela unei terte persoane. Capacitatea de exercitiu rezida in aptitudinea persoanei de a-si exercita drepturile pe cont propriu. Punerea sub interdictie este unul din mijloacele institutionale prin care statul condamna persoanele cu dizabilitati la marginalizare fizica si simbolica, alaturi de formele de invatamant segregate, institutiile rezidentiale, lipsa accessibilitatii etc. Pe de o parte, punerea sub interdictie priveaza persoanele cu dizabilitati de drepturile lor fundamentale, precum accesul la justitie sau dreptul la munca, condamnandu-le la destitutie. Pe de alta parte, punerea sub interdictie, care presupune intre altele pierderea automata a dreptului la vot, marcheaza in mod simbolic persoanele cu dizabilitati ca cetateni de mana a doua, sau chiar ca non-persoane, sens in care se vorbeste de “moartea lor civila”.

Procedura punerii sub interdictie este reglementata in Codul Civil, care precizeaza in articolul 164§1 ca “persoana care nu are discernamantul necesar pentru a se ingriji de interesele sale, din cauza alienatiei ori debilitatii mintale, va fi pusa sub interdictie judecatoreasca”. In ciuda efectelor sale dramatice si permanente asupra persoanei, punerea sub interdictie este instituita cu un minimum de garantii procedurale, in instante blazate si indiferente, cu avocati din oficiu indolenti si ignoranti, cu procurorii sau autoritatile tutelare jucand un rol decorativ, fara participarea efectiva a persoanei vizate, bazat exclusiv pe avizul medicilor psihiatri. In vasta majoritate a cazurilor, procedura punerii sub interdictie are loc cu implicarea activa a familiei, care isi asuma sarcina de tutore. Punerea sub interdictie devine insa aproape imposibila in cazul persoanelor cu dizabilitati fara familie, deseori institutionalizate, in ciuda nevoilor de suport si asistenta evidente ale acestora.

Procedura punerii sub interdictie este infestata de stereotipuri negative cu privire la persoanele cu dizabilitati, vazute, dupa caz, ca niste persoane neputincioase asimilate copiilor, sau ca niste bestii periculoase care trebuie tinute sub atenta supraveghere. Departe de a fi o masura de protectie, dupa cum este prezentata in mod formal, punerea sub interdictie faciliteaza adesea abuzurile impotriva persoanei.  Astfel de abuzuri pot fi comise de familie, care pot incerca manipularea procedurii cu scopul de a prelua controlul asupra bunurile persoanei vizate, sau de autoritati, avand in vedere ca punerea sub interdictie priveaza persoana de accesul la justitie, facilitand controlul fizic asupra acesteia sub forma institutionalizarii sau administrarii de tratament medical fortat. In fine, punerea sub interdictie se preteaza la abuzuri sub forma invocarii sale cu rea credinta in conflictele intre persoane private. O data pusa sub interdictie, persoanei in cauza ii va fi foarte greu daca nu imposibil sa obtina ridicarea masurii. Pe de alta parte, conditiile punerii sub interdictie nu sunt supravegheate efectiv, nici supuse unui control periodic, astfel incat masura devine de facto permanenta.

Punerea sub interdictie, reglementata prin apel la termeni anacronici si profund jignitori (“interdictie”! “alienatie”! “debilitate”!), este un artefact juridic aflat in profunda contradictie cu standardele internationale de drepturile omului pe care Romania este tinuta sa le respecte. Astfel, Curtea Europeana a Drepturile Omului a criticat alte state cu institutii similare pentru motive tinand de inflexibilitate, avand in vedere ca acest regim presupune o falsa dihotomie intre persoane cu si fara discernamant, ca nu corespunde circumstantelor diverse ale persoanelor cu sau fara dizabilitati mintale, si ca nu ofera suficiente garantii impotriva abuzurilor. Dreptul Uniunii Europene interzice discriminarea persoanelor cu dizabilitati in campul muncii sau in legatura cu anumite aspecte ale dreptului la vot, chestiuni care sunt afectate in cadrul procedurii punerii sub interdictie. In mod crucial, institutia punerii sub interdictie este in flagranta contradictie cu etosul Conventiei Natiunilor Unite pentru Drepturile Persoanelor cu Dizabilitati, constand in valori precum demnitatea, egalitatea, participarea si autonomia. Mai concret, Conventia interzice institutiile de tipul punerii sub interdictie, bazata pe substitutia vointei persoanei cu dizabilitati,  dictand inlocuirea lor cu regimuri de suport, in care persoanele sunt ajutate sa ia decizii pe cont propriu.

Tarile din regiune, incluzand de exemplu Letonia, Cehia, Croatia sau Moldova au recunoscut caracterul problematic al institutiilor de tipul punerii sub interdictie, initiind reforme de substanta, deseori in urma unor hotarari judecatoresti la nivel de Curte Constituionala sau Curte Suprema. In Romania este de notorietate situatia dramatica a persoanelor cu dizabilitati, indeosebi ale celor din institutii, insa resorturile ascunse ale acestei stari de fapt raman mai degraba neintelese si neabordate. Intre aceste cauze profunde se afla si institutia punerii sub interdictie, care trebuie urgent reformata. Recent, organizatia neguvernamentala Pentru Voi a propus un proiect de lege care ar modifica unele din trasaturile cele mai problematice ale punerii sub interdictie. Pe de alta parte, litigiul aflat pe rolul Curtii Constitutionale, primul atac frontal impotriva regimului juridic actual din perpectiva drepturilor omului, reprezinta o sansa pentru relansarea unei dezbateri care sa vizeze statutul persoanelor cu dizabilitati mintale in societatea noastra in general, si modalitatile in care acestea pot primi suportul necesar pentru luarea autonoma a deciziilor in mod special.

Pentru mai multe detalii, intrebari sau pentru cei ce doresc sa puna umarul la acest effort, ii invit sa ma contacteze pe adresa de email constantincojocariu@yahoo.comsau pe celelalte canale de comunicare cunoscute.

Important development in the area of mental health detention from the European Court of Human Rights

December 14, 2017, 8:44 am

≫ Next: Positive outcome in transgender case before the European Court of Human Rights

≪ Previous: Persoanele cu dizabilitati in fata Curtii Constitutionale a Romaniei

$

0

0

The European Court of Human Rights’ recent ruling in the case N. v. Romania (decided on 28 November)has important implications in the areas of mental health detention and community living. The applicant was a man diagnosed with schizophrenia who complained about the legality of his detention in various psychiatric hospitals since 2001, on account of unsubstantiated sexual assault allegations that had never been reviewed in court. On 28 November 2017, the Court ruled that his detention lacked a legal basis or justification at least since 2007 (the Court declined to examine the period before 2007, including the initial decision to detain the applicant, for reasons of admissibility). In addition, the Court held that the judicial proceedings for the review of the applicant’s continued detention since 2007 had not afforded sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness. Consequently, the Court found several breaches of Article 5 (right to liberty) of the European Convention on Human Rights and awarded the applicant 38,050 Euro in damages and costs. This is a brief analysis of the main points of interest in the judgment.

The Court criticized the authorities’ failure to undergo a “rigorous” assessment of the applicant’s needs or secure his release in conditions that matched those needs despite a judicial order ending his compulsory hospitalization issued at the beginning of 2017. The Court remarked that this case was symptomatic of a systemic problem in Romania in that there was a lack of social services to assist people transitioning from institutional living. Despite the authorities’ formal adherence to international norms advocating for community living, there was a failure to provide the applicant with suitable services upon his release. In view of these circumstances, the Court took the unusual step of demanding that the applicant be released “without delay […] in conditions meeting his needs.” These findings and the wording of the remedial measure create a crucial new opening in the Court’s jurisprudence in this area, suggesting that Article 5 may be construed to imply a positive obligation incumbent in State Parties to provide the community services needed facilitate the release of individuals from unjustified mental health detention.

The Court also noted the superficial manner in which national courts reviewed the necessity of the applicant’s ongoing detention between 2007 and 2017. In particular, they failed to establish the main criterion in domestic law for detention of this type, namely that the person in question represented a danger to society. National courts impermissibly inferred the existence of danger from allegations of sexual assault that had never been proven in court and from the applicant’s diagnosis in itself. In that respect, the Court recalled under Article 14 of the CRPD, “the existence of a disability could not in itself justify a deprivation of liberty.” The successive sets of proceedings on review were flawed for a number of additional reasons. Notably, the Court criticized the ineffectual performance of the ex officio lawyers appointed to represent the applicant through the years, who had either argued in favor of his continued detention or had left the matter to the discretion of the courts, and never got in touch with him before the hearings took place.

The Court warned that these deficiencies were likely to give rise to other well-founded applications in the future. It therefore indicated additional general measures to the Romanian State: to ensure that the detention of individuals in psychiatric hospitals was lawful, justified and not arbitrary; and to ensure that any individuals detained in such institutions are entitled to take proceedings affording adequate safeguards with a view to securing a speedy court decision on the lawfulness of their detention. The Court uses its power to indicate individual or general remedial measures under Article 46 of the Convention on an exceptional basis, in cases that highlight systemic or structural problems with the potential to generate significant numbers of similar complaints in the future.

The judgment is infused with references to the CRPD and the work of the CRPD Committee. The Court cited with approval Article 14 of the CRPD (“liberty and security of the person”), the CRPD Committee’s statement of interpretation on Article 14, its Marlon James Noble v. Australia decision, with facts that are strikingly similar to those in N. v. Romania, as well as Article 19 (“living independently and being included in the community”). Thus, the N. v. Romaniaruling is another step in the process of reconciling the two human rights instruments, including with respect to such divisive issues as mental health detention. Also notable is the Court’s willingness to highlight the systemic underpinnings of the violations found and indicate individual and general remedial measures to the Romanian State. The Court had previously made similar use of its remedial powers in another disability case originating from Romania, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Campeanu, decided in 2014, urging the Romanian authorities to “envisage the necessary general measures to ensure that mentally disabled persons […] are afforded independent representation, enabling them to have Convention complaints relating to their health and treatment examined before a court or other independent body.” These two judgments, in addition to other jurisprudence, constitute a strong platform that Romanian advocates may use to push for badly needed reform in the areas of access to justice and deinstitutionalization.   

The Court’s judgment (in French) is available here:

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-178948

The press release (in English) is available here:

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=003-5927675-7571175

The applicants in N. v. Romania, as well as in ValentinCampeanu v. Romania, were represented by Constantin Cojocariu, a lawyer licensed to practice in Romania and based in London.

Positive outcome in transgender case before the European Court of Human Rights

January 18, 2019, 5:20 am

≫ Next: Disability inclusive education case communicated by European Court of Human Rights

≪ Previous: Important development in the area of mental health detention from the European Court of Human Rights

$

0

0

Last week, I was saying that I usually got one good and one bad judgment from the European Court every year and was wondering where this one would sit. It turns out it sits somewhere in between.

The X. v. Macedonia judgment announced yesterday by the Court holds great promise for the future in that it requires Macedonia to adopt legislation on legal gender recognition in line with international standards. Macedonia remains one of the last countries in Europe without even a semblance of legislation on legal gender recognition, with trans people forced to flee the country or live in limbo. 

The dissenting opinion of judges Pejchal and Wojtyczek on the other hand is the latest and perhaps most vicious signal that reactionary conservative propaganda is well and truly entrenched at the Court, raising a worrying question about values and about the nature of the mandate entrusted to judges sitting on a human rights court. More about this in due time. 

I am particularly delighted with a small but meaningful detail in the first paragraph of the judgment, stating that "Respecting his self-identification, the Court will refer to his gender as male." The practice of the Court so far on designating trans applicants has been rather mixed so far, with misgendering a source of great frustration for applicants and their representatives. The Court's clearly-stated commitment to self-identification is a telling response to a question I raised during the meeting between Court and applicants that took place in Strasbourg one month ago. It is very encouraging to see that dialogue make a meaningful difference, rather than being an empty notion!

My role in this case has been as main cheerleader and supporter to the applicant's lawyer, Natasa Boskova, whose hard work and selfless commitment through the years were truly inspirational and whom I am grateful to call a friend. Last but not least, I would like to salute X for his resilience and optimism in the face of great adversity. I hope your case gets settled and that a great new law will finally be adopted soon enough!

ILGA Europe statement is available HERE. 

The judgment is available HERE. 

Disability inclusive education case communicated by European Court of Human Rights

March 27, 2019, 8:15 am

≫ Next: Deinstitutionalisation of psychiatric patients in Romania

≪ Previous: Positive outcome in transgender case before the European Court of Human Rights

$

0

0

This is a short note regarding an inclusive education case v. Romania communicated recently by the European Court of Human Rights. I act as the applicants' co-counsel, along with Catalina Radulescu.

The case M.C. and others. v. Romania involves an 11-year old child with persistent disciplinary problems attributed to a diagnosis of oppositional disorder, and his parents. In 2010, an NGO contracted by the parents to evaluate and monitor his condition, issued the school in Bucharest where he was enrolled with detailed advice about handling the situation, including by creating a predictable, rule-based learning environment, using a support teacher and a school counsellor, highlighting positive behaviour and ignoring minor incidents, keeping criticism at a minimum. 

However, once the NGO team left, the situation deteriorated fast. The school failed to take any of the measures available under the law to evaluate and accommodate the child’s disability and started instead to blame him for the disruption.  At the beginning of 2011, the child’s parents installed a hidden recording device in his school uniform. Thus, they obtained many hours of recordings of intemperate and vicious abuse inflicted on the child by teachers and other children. Confronted by the parents, the school applied pressure on the applicants to seek a transfer, instigated other parents to complain about and campaign against the presence of a disabled child in school, blamed and denigrated the parents and the child and applied increasingly more severe disciplinary sanctions. The regulatory and supervisory agencies refused to get involved. The child was effectively forced to drop out from school. He started the next academic year with a private school where he received the support he needed and eventually flourished. 

Criminal proceedings focused narrowly on the liability of one teacher, who received a suspended prison sentence of one year for abusive behaviour. Civil proceedings focusing on bullying, the lack of reasonable accommodation and support were thrown out, with courts rejecting the use of audio recordings as evidence on the basis that they were done illegally, and ignoring the verdict rendered in criminal courts that they theoretically were bound to follow. The decisions handed down at the national level are rife with negative stereotypes regarding the ability of children with psychosocial disabilities to learn in mainstream schools and disregard for relevant regulations that would accommodate disability. 

We lodged the complaint with the European Court of Human Rights in September 2018. The Court communicated the case in in record time, in February 2109. All relevant issues are well represented in the questions asked by the Court – the States’ obligation to prevent, protect from and investigate bullying, the accommodations required in order to ensure equal access to education for children with psychosocial disabilities with challenging behaviour, access to justice with respect to abuses taking place in school, and in particular the use of evidence from hidden recording devices, disability-based discrimination. The evidence is very persuasive and the case has been argued reasonably well at all stages. 

This is an important opportunity for pushing the Court to develop its standards on inclusive education for children with psychosocial disabilities. We therefore invite support in any form, including third party interventions. The communication is available HERE.

This is the second disability education case against Romania that a team of lawyers involving Constantin Cojocariu and Catalina Radulescu have brought before the European Court of Human Rights. The first one, still pending, is Stoian v. Romania, which drew third party interventions from the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Disability Rights and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights among others. The Court communications in that case are available HERE and HERE. 

Deinstitutionalisation of psychiatric patients in Romania

March 28, 2019, 10:43 am

≫ Next: Persoanele cu dizabilități la moment de sărbătoare: între un prezent apăsător și un posibil viitor incluziv

≪ Previous: Disability inclusive education case communicated by European Court of Human Rights

$

0

0

This is a short note that I wrote for the European Implementation Network website, where it was published originally. 

On 29 January 2001, Alexandru Nabosnyi was arrested and committed to a psychiatric hospital, based on a short news story in a local newspaper, accusing him of various sexual crimes. A psychiatric report subsequently stated he lacked discernment due to being diagnosed with schizophrenia and a court formally validated the psychiatric detention order. The criminal investigation, which was protracted and superficial, resulted in most charges against him being dropped. Regardless, Mr. Nabosnyi went on to spend his next seventeen years involuntarily detained in high security psychiatric hospitals. 

Mr. Nabosnyi went before courts regularly, asking to be released, but the default position was that he was too ill and too dangerous to be released, despite the charges against him having been dropped. The European Court of Human Rights took a different view. By a judgment delivered on 28 February 2018 in the case N. v. Romania, the Court decided that Mr. Nabosnyi had been unlawfully detained since at least 2007. The national authorities had failed to adduce any evidence to prove that he was dangerous. His release was delayed by the absence of suitable facilities helping patients re-settle after long periods of detention. The proceedings reviewing the validity of Mr. Nabosnyi’s detention were flawed due to poor ex officio legal assistance and widespread procedural irregularities. In line with Mr. Nabosnyi’s request, the Court made use of its powers under Article 46 and instructed the Romanian Government to immediately release him in conditions meeting his needs and to take general measures ensuring that psychiatric detention was lawful, justified and not arbitrary.

From the outset, two obstacles hampered the implementation process. First, after having spent seventeen years in psychiatric detention, Mr. Nabosnyi lacked a network of support in the community, besides not owning any property. Far from being a mere formality, his release and transition to living in the community required substantial preparation and assistance. Second, at the beginning of 2018, after separate proceedings occasioned by his initial complaint to Strasbourg, a local court placed him under plenary guardianship and named a local village mayor to act as guardian. This decision had complex ramifications to do with being able to take decisions related to living in the community or enjoying the just satisfaction awarded by the Court.  

On 2 May 2018, I filed a Rule 9§1 submission on Mr. Nabosnyi’s behalf, informing the Committee of Ministers about the bureaucratic inertia hindering his release to a suitable community-based arrangement and about his placement under guardianship. Following the submission, on 29 May 2018, Mr. Nabosnyi was finally released from the psychiatric hospital and transferred to a social care home in Bucharest, his hometown. Although that is also a closed institution, it is a superior arrangement that provides a sense of progress after seventeen years of psychiatric detention. On 20 August 2018, I made the second Rule 9§1 submission, attempting to dispel the Government’s argument to the effect that the social care home constituted a satisfactory solution, rather than, as I argued, a mere stepping-stone to a community-based arrangement, corresponding with the Court’s Article 46 request. 

Beyond individual implications, Mr. Nabosnyi’s case shines a light on Romania’s forensic detention system, which warehouses psychiatric patients in very poor conditions, often indefinitely, without meaningful judicial scrutiny. A European Implementation Network workshop in May 2018 helped me prepare the forthcoming exchanges with the Romanian Government before the Committee of Ministers regarding general measures. On 29 October 2018, the Government submitted a poor action plan, devoid of meaningful substance. On 21 November 2018, I submitted a detailed Rule 9§2 briefing on behalf of three disability rights non-governmental organizations, providing the Committee of Ministers with information regarding the general state of the forensic detention system in Romania and outlining the general measures required with a view to achieving reform and ensuring access to justice for patients. 

In December 2018, the Committee of Ministers issued a very positive decision, in line with our expectations. On general measures, the CM asked the Government to submit a revised action plan. On individual measures, the CM accepted that the social care home was but a temporary arrangement and called on the Government to ensure Mr. Nabosnyi’s move to community living as soon as practicable. In addition, the CM strongly criticized the guardianship system in place in Romania, which deprived Mr. Nabosnyi of “the exercise of his civil and political rights,” called for immediate reform and asked the Government to ensure his interests were safeguarded in the interim period. 

The Committee of Ministers process constituted a catalyst for increased advocacy at the domestic level to reform the forensic detention system. New alliances were formed, that engaged in dialogue with the Government. Other procedures were leveraged for pressure, including by securing positive references in the Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on her visit to Romania in November 2018. On individual measures, the authorities are working towards securing Mr. Nabosnyi’s transfer to the first state-run sheltered housing facilities in Bucharest, that are due to be opened this year. 

Persoanele cu dizabilități la moment de sărbătoare: între un prezent apăsător și un posibil viitor incluziv

May 9, 2019, 7:42 am

≫ Next: Court goes rogue in inclusive education case - initial thoughts on Stoian v. Romania judgment

≪ Previous: Deinstitutionalisation of psychiatric patients in Romania

$

0

0

 Am scris acest articol pentru publicatia Jurnal Social a Consiliului National al Dizabilitatii din Romania, cu ocazia Zilei europene a vietii independente, celebrate pe 5 mai 2019. 

Ziua europeană a vieții independente, sărbătorită în fiecare an pe 5 mai, oferă persoanelor cu dizabilități un prilej de a revendica o societate mai bună, care le respectă autonomia, care oferă oportunități egale și care le asigură accesul la aceleasi opțiuni și la decizii proprii în viața de zi cu zi. Viața independentă presupune un mediu construit accesibil, accesul la tehnologii asistive, accesul la asistență personală și la servicii de sprijin localizate în comunitate. Această viziune generoasă vine în contrast cu realitatea cotidiană din România, caracterizată de precaritate socio-economică, dependență, segregare, excluziune, prejudecăți și stigmă.

Faptul că persoanele cu dizabilități duc o viață foarte grea este o afirmație banalizată prin repetare. Dincolo de generalități și sloganuri, avem niște oameni mai degrabă invizibili și familiile lor. Multe persoane cu dizabilități, de ordinul sutelor de mii, trăiesc izolate în comunitate. Ele sunt mai sărace decât restul populației și multe nu au un loc de munca. Persoanele cu dizabilități sunte adesea blocate într-o relație de depedență față de Stat (care le acordă unele beneficii modice) și față de familie (ca singură sursă de suport). Lipsa accesibilității mediului construit completează acest peisaj deprimant. Pe de altă parte, avem persoanele cu dizabilități din instituții, de ordinul zecilor de mii. Acolo ajung cei care nu respectă profilul mai sus amintit, de obicei pentru ca au pierdut într-un fel sau altul sprijinul familial sau din cauza unui șoc economic în contextul regimului de austeritate și degradare economică de după căderea comunismului. Instituționalizarea este în vasta majoritate a cazurilor un drum cu sens unic. Deși pretextul instituțiilor este caritabil si asistențial, în fapt ele au menirea de a controla o gamă largă de indivizi cu trăsături indezirabile din diverse motive. Sistemul instituțional reproduce si consolidează stereotipurile negative la adresa persoanelor cu dizabilități, previne crearea unor alternative efective de sprijin în comunitate și este caracterizat de dezechilibre vaste de putere între ‘beneficiari’ și angajații statului, fapt ce crează condiții prielnice pentru săvârșirea și disimularea unor abuzuri grave. 

Noțiuni generoase precum viața independentă, încorporate de altfel în Convenția ONU pentru drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilități, par un alt exemplu de auto-iluzionare si escapism, o beție cu apă rece. Avem doar și noi legile noastre care garantează drepturi fundamentale pentru toți și care interzic abuzurile, dar care co-există cu o viață segregată incepând din copilărie (în școli speciale) și până la moarte (în instituții rezidențiale). Legile noastre par mai mult o perdea de fum, menită să ascundă și să cosmetizeze precaritatea și lipsa de speranță a vieții de zi cu zi. Deși, date fiind aceste condiții vitrege, fatalismul și renunțarea sunt de înțeles, e bine de știut totuși că există destui care nu au depus armele. Văd două posibile strategii pentru ieșirea din pasivitate și dependență: activismul juridic și implicarea politică. 

În ceea ce privește activismul juridic, există unele condiții favorabile. Avem pe de o parte mai-sus menționata Convenție pentru Drepturile Persoanelor cu Dizabilități, adoptată cu participarea persoanelor cu dizabilități și ratificată universal, care articulează aspirația la participare și incluziune pentru toți, o unitate de măsură care ne permite să evaluăm situația actuală si direcția în care ne îndreptam, care conferă putere simbolica și suport moral. Avem mai apoi acces la un sistem de instanțe rezonabil de independente și competente, care trebuie învățate să înțeleagă experiența persoanelor cu dizabilități și să acorde protecție efectivă împotriva discriminării. Problema cu pasivitatea este că transformă predicția privind inutilitatea drepturilor în realitate – dacă nu te lupți pentru drepuri, nimeni nu va veni să ți le ofere pe un platou, sau cel puțin nu în Romania.

În ciuda aparenței unei populații amorfe și supuse, există multe persoane curajoase și cu spirit de sacrificiu care se luptă de ani întregi cu sistemul. Ele trebuie cunoscute mai bine și celebrate pentru munca de pionierat pe care o fac. Mamele (singure) de copii cu dizabilități, care fac totul de la cărat copilul în cârcă la școală, supravegheat în timpul orelor, agonisit traiul de zi cu zi, făcut munca de predare acasă, mers în instanțe judecătorești pentru lupte de ani întregi cu autorităţile statului. Bărbatul în scaun rulant care dorește să studieze, dar care ajunge până la CEDO pentru a se plânge de lipsa de accesibilitate a universităților. Bărbatul cu schizofrenie închis pe nedrept timp de 17 ani într-un spital de psihiatrie, care merge în instanță an de an pentru a-și revendica drepturile, care ajunge până la CEDO și este pus în libertate. Bărbatul în scaun rulant dat afară de la servici atunci când biroul său este mutat la etajul unei clădiri inaccesibile, și care constată ca instanțele sunt de asemenea inaccesibile. Copilul cu dizabilități de clasa a V-a hărțuit și insultat de profesori și alți copii timp de luni întregi, ai cărui parinți merg în instanță și obțin condamnarea vinovaților. 

Implicarea politică, temă predilectă a organizațiilor europene din zona dizabilității în acest an electoral, poate de asemenea reprezenta o soluție. Conform statisticilor oficiale, avem aproximativ opt sute de mii de persoane cu dizabilități. Dacă includem și rudele apropiate, ajungem la cifra respectabilă de peste un milion de votanți direct interesați de politicile statului în domeniul dizabilității. Trebuie însă să coborâm cu picioarele pe pământ. Obstacolele structurale menționate mai sus limitează în egală măsură participarea in viața publică. Impedimente de ordin practic sau juridic precum lipsa accesibilității, lipsa informației în format accesibil, procedura punerii sub interdicție sau izolarea în instituții, împiedică adesea exercitarea dreptului la vot. În plus, persoanele cu dizabilitati, lipsite de informație și cu un nivel mediu de educație mai scăzut, sunt susceptibile cântecelor de sirenă populiste din partea unor partide care pledează de fapt pentru politici care le defavorizează, cum ar fi cele de reducere a statului.  Și aici avem de a face cu un cerc vicios, căci lipsa de participare transmite ideea politicienilor că interesele persoanelor cu dizabilități nu sunt demne de luat în considerare, sau că acestea sunt incapabile de a-și exercita drepturile cetățenești. Este important ca persoanele cu dizabilități să fie mai exigente cu politicienii, prioritizând drepturile proprii atunci cand evaluează ofertele electorale. 

Și în această privință există motive de optimism, în ultimul timp făcându-și apariția pe scena politică unele inițiative care prioritizează explicit drepturile persoanelor cu dizabilități. Demos este un partid social democrat nou înființat, care își asumămisiunea politicăde a lupta împotriva inegalităților sociale și pentru respectarea drepturilor fundamentale pentru toți. Dizabilitatea este inclusă transversal în toate documentele, politicile și luările de poziție ale partidului, dublat de o înțelegere nuanțată a resorturilor social-economice care împing persoanele cu dizabilități spre marginea societății. Demos își propune sărecruteze în mod activ persoane din categorii vulnerabile si dezavantajate în structurile sale, deja numărând activiști cu dizabilitățidiverse din comunitate, dar și din instituții, printre membri si simpatizanți. În plus, campania candidatei independente la alegerile pentru Parlamentul European, Mădălina Turza, care a reușit performanța remarcabilă de a aduna zeci de mii de semnături în sprijinul unei platforme dedicate exclusiv drepturilor copiilor cu dizabilitățila participare si incluziune socială. 

Constantin Cojocariu este avocat si activist Demos. Ajută persoanele cu dizabilități de 15 ani să-și reclame drepturile în instanțele din România și din Europa. 

Court goes rogue in inclusive education case - initial thoughts on Stoian v. Romania judgment

June 28, 2019, 6:55 am

≫ Next: Submissions on the applicants' behalf in Stoian v. Romania

≪ Previous: Persoanele cu dizabilități la moment de sărbătoare: între un prezent apăsător și un posibil viitor incluziv

$

0

0

The Court's judgment in Stoian v. Romania has to stand as a major stain on the record of an organisation, that is anything but unblemished. 

A HUMAN RIGHTS court that distorts and truncates the facts. 

A HUMAN RIGHTS court that reduces a case that resulted from years and years of litigation, that includes mountains of evidence, that attracted multiple interventions from prestigious organisations, concerning an uncharted area of jurisprudence, to a committee case (formed of such luminaries as the judges from ROM, HUN and BiH), to be dismissed definitively with a minimum of fuss.

A HUMAN RIGHTS Court that cherry picks the facts and brushes complexity aside to suit a pre-determined outcome.

A HUMAN RIGHTS Court that refuses to engage with the facts of case, effectively denying people with disabilities protection under the Convention. 

A HUMAN RIGHTS court that dismisses a story that boils down to a woman carrying her disabled child on her back to school for years on end, as responsible state policy.

A HUMAN RIGHTS court that characterises a police operation that involved forcefully removing a mother from school for providing personal assistance to her disabled child and causing her injuries that required 45 days of medical treatment as not in any way "disproportionate."

A HUMAN RIGHTS court that systematically dismisses people with disabilities as a drain on public resources and as essentially disposable.

Is not a court and has nothing to do with human rights. 

I have worked with this court for fifteen years and during this time I have had good moments and bad moments. But nothing, absolutely nothing, prepared me for this blow, that left me and my clients in tears and gasping for air. 

This is shameful, but it also portents great danger ahead. Our assumptions are collapsing before our eyes, as far as I am concerned I no longer take anything for granted.

---

Submissions on the applicants' behalf in Stoian v. Romania

August 7, 2019, 7:25 am

≫ Next: Critical analysis of Stoian v. Romania judgment

≪ Previous: Court goes rogue in inclusive education case - initial thoughts on Stoian v. Romania judgment

$

0

0

[under construction]

28.02.2014 Initial application

7.04.2015 Observations

13.02.2017 Supplementary application

23.11.2017 Supplementary observations

3.06.2019 Consolidated list of exhausted domestic proceedings (seven pages)

18.01.2018 Decision in criminal proceedings re. incident at School no. 131

Critical analysis of Stoian v. Romania judgment

September 5, 2019, 7:11 am

≫ Next: Constitutional Court strikes down oppressive guardianship provisions from Romanian Civil Code.

≪ Previous: Submissions on the applicants' behalf in Stoian v. Romania

$

0

0

With the end of summer, the pushback against the Court's drift on disability rights in general and inclusive education in particular begins.

In this contribution for the Strasbourg Observers blog, hopefully the first in a series, I am trying to dissect and (begin at least) to interpret some of the more egregious failures in the judgment Stoian v. Romania.

While this judgment appears to be part of a trend on disability rights as discussed in my article, downgrading disability rights appears to have been used as pretext for the court, or this particular panel of judges, to take great liberties with its procedure in order to achieve a pre-conceived outcome. 

Also included in the article is a link to some of my submissions and pieces of evidence in the case, if somebody cares to look into this matter in more detail - SEE THE FOLLOWING POST, below. 

"Stoian v. Romania: the Court’s drift on disability rights intensifies

September 5, 2019 Guest Blogger Disability, Right to Education, Stoian v. Romania
By Constantin Cojocariu

On 25 June 2019, the Court released an eagerly awaited judgment in the case of Stoian v. Romania, brought by a disabled child and his mother, who complained about the denial of the right to education. The Court, ruling as a Committee, rejected all claims, brutally ending an unprecedented litigation campaign on inclusive education that lasted a decade. While the judgment generated outcry among disability rights activists worldwide, it also displayed warning signs about procedural shortcuts taken by the Court and its approach to vulnerable applicants more widely. The judgment’s bottom line, that the fundamental rights of persons of disabilities are primarily a matter of resources that disqualifies them from protection under the Convention, is relatively unsurprising, though depressing and not befitting of a human rights court. What is more interesting is how the Court reached this verdict, by downgrading the case to the three-judge Committee level, by distorting the facts, by adopting the Government’s views wholesale and by refusing to apply meaningful scrutiny. In that sense, to some extent, what is lacking from the official record is more interesting than what was included. This is why an admittedly partisan account of the judgment such as the present one – I acted as the applicants’ co-counsel – may prove interesting to the readers of the Strasbourg Observers blog."

Constitutional Court strikes down oppressive guardianship provisions from Romanian Civil Code.

July 24, 2020, 7:34 am

≪ Previous: Critical analysis of Stoian v. Romania judgment

$

0

0

On 16 July 2020, the Romanian Constitutional Court struck down as unconstitutional the provision in the Civil Code regarding plenary guardianship (or ‘judicial interdiction’ in a literal translation), putting an end to a legal institution that had survived virtually unchanged since 1864. The official press release issued on this occasion states that ‘judicial interdiction’ is not accompanied by sufficient guarantees ensuring the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Furthermore, ‘interdiction’ does not distinguish between different degrees of incapacity or take into account the plurality of individual interests, is not applied for a determined period and is not subject to regular review. The Court held that any measure of protection must be proportionate to the degree of capacity, adapted to the life of the person, apply for the shortest time possible, be revised periodically and take into account the will and preferences of persons with disabilities. Notably, the Court mentioned that its decision was guided by Article 12 of the CRPD. 

This judgment is the latest stage of a legal saga that extended over the past six years, involving Mr. N., a man with psycho-social disabilities and psychiatric hospitals survivor, and his representative, London-based Romanian lawyer Constantin Cojocariu, acting on a voluntary basis. The campaign includes, besides the Constitutional Court judgment, a breakthrough European Court of Human Rights judgment in the case N. v. Romania (2017), requiring the State to plot a path back to the community for hundreds of forensic patients who languish in Romanian psychiatric hospitals without any hope of release. Another case involving Mr. N., N. A. v. Romania, challenging his placement under guardianship, is pending before the European Court of Human Rights, has been communicated twice (here and here) and has been designated a leading case. In parallel, involvement in the execution procedure before the Committee of Ministers in relation to the N. v. Romania judgment has resulted in Mr. N. being transferred to supported housing in Bucharest after 18 years of institutionalisation, one of the first publicly funded schemes of this type in Romania, implemented on this occasion by Estuar Foundation. 

The Constitutional Court judgment is a rare clarion call in a country where people with disabilities face layers upon layers of deprivation, while advocacy on their behalf is often not rights-based and serves instead to entrench these phenomena. The judgment opens the way for a potentially wide-ranging and long-awaited reform of the country’s guardianship legislation. The Parliament has 45 days to legislate for an alternative solution once the full judgment is published in the Official Gazette. At the same time, the uncertain political situation in Romania, with two rounds of elections scheduled to take place by the end of the year, the continued fallout from the pandemics, poor administrative capacity and the relative absence of strong rights-based civil society and DPOs in particular may conspire to scupper this effort. 

The Constitutional Court judgment has been profiled by the Committee of Ministers on its front page here. Constantin Cojocariu has previously written about different aspects of this campaign for the European Implementation Network and Strasbourg Observers. A short case comment on N. v. Romania is available here.

The photo shows Mr. N. and his lawyer attending a hearing at the Constitutional Court at the end of 2019. Mr. N. is presumably the first and last person under ‘interdiction’ to address the Constitutional Court.